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PRE f ACE. 
The Major problems facing me during both the research 
and the writing of this essay were the material available 
and the nature of the subject. Initially, both the 
necessary material and Jagger's character and role as 
linister of Railways seemed remarkably elusive. The 
nature of the material available tended to enforce a 
reliance on Jagger's actions in parliament and the crises 
which he faced on that somewhat isolated stage, and on the 
gleanings from an almost exclusively partisan press. 
Jagger himself was a humourless, dry and lonely man whose 
private life remained his own business. His public career 
was the common story of the "boy with brains" who "did well 
in the Colonies". Another problem rises out of the fact 
that Jagger was appointed Minister of Railways and Harbours, 
a portfolio as dryas his personality. 
These factors go a long way towards explaining the 
generally uncontroversial nature of the material presented 
in this essay. Any dullness and related deficiencies are, 
of course, entirely the fault of the writer. It could 
be asked of what possible significance grain elevators, 
harbour extensions and railway deficits are. It is unlikely 
that any of these features will ever be considered to be 
of major significance to the history of South Africa in the 
twentieth century. In fact it could never really be said 
that J.W.Jagger was of major significance to South African 
history. What is presented here, however, be it dry 
statistics or seemingly absurd scandals about grain 










found compelling. These aspects of South African 
life, the economic aspects, are where Jagger found 
fulfilment. To many this may seem incomprehensible, 
but this was Jagger's life. Life, after all, is at the 
core of history and it is only by immersing ourselves in 
the past, as historians, that we can hope to understand 
the present. Thus Jagger's life - albeit a dry and humour-
less life - is history; it lives; it is the "stuff of 
which dreams are made". Statistics and ways and means of 
economising comprise the essence of both Jagger's term of 
office as Minister of Railways and Harbours, and in fact 
of his entire life. The making of money, the best ways 
of saving it, and the best ways of spending it for the 












THE fIRST STORMY 10NTHS 
J.II. Jagger was one of the leading ex-thdtmists, 
together with Sir Tho.as S.artt and Patrlet.:'6umnsn, brought 
into S.uts· eabinet on larch 10, 1921. S.ut.---.ad. hi. 
his .inister of Railways and Harbours ~ a ta.k which was 
openly acknowledged a. an extre.ely for.idasle one. The 
story haa often baen told that S.uts took Jaggsr into the 
cabinet and gave hi. expre •• instructions to reaedy the 
railway finance. in any way he could without fear of inter-
ference fro. S.uts. Thare is however no actual docu.antary 
evidence of this. It is to Jagger's credit that he .anaged 
to fill this office with aplo.b. Yet the years of S.uts' 
second govern.ent saw Jagger faced with nu.erous crises, 
not all of which were co.pttently handled. Thi. was partly 
the re.ult of the very trying econo.ic situation at the 
ti.e. 
After a brief post-war boo. of inflationary expansion, 
prices of produce fell very seriously in 1920 and there was 
a world-wide depre •• ion in trade which adverwtrl'y'aff1Jcted 
the South African econo.y. Credit was .hartened ~. un-
e.ploy.ent figure. ro.e sharply and this, warkinCJ "i'n cunjunction 
with factors such as vastly increased social .obttit" 
falling profits and labour unrest, gave rise to'widnpread 
discontent. The whole financial situation war-hT'''t-ln:t 
extra.ely grave. "The general condition of thw eeontry 
since the war was bad. Agriculture, .ith l ..... cnnt-'fluctuating 
prices, offered little security and secondary iftdustry was in 











prosperity was the gold.ining industry and that was being 
threatened by abnormal post.war conditions.-(l) The gold 
price "fell froM 130 shillings in february, 1920 to 95 
shillings in Oece.ber, 1921. Gold production decreased 
fro. 8,332,000 fine oz. in 1919 to 8,129,000 in 1921, and 
production costs rose from 22/lld per ton of ore in 1919 
to 25/8d in 1921, ulti.ately forCing SOMe of the low grade 
mines to close down.-(2) Henry Burton, .inister of finance, 
in his Budget Speech of April 15, 1921 ·unfolded a Budget 
which was a tale of falling revenue and increased taxation~(3) 
The financial situation on the South African Railways 
and Harbours when Jagger beca.e Minister was equally serious. 
On Jagger's entry into the Cabinet the Cape Times co •• ented 
"It is quite certain that Ir. Jagger, in his new capacity 
as linister of Railway. and Harbours, will find that he has 
not fallen on a bed of roses ••••• The finances of the 
railways are in an exceedingly anxious position today, and 
it will require all the business aCUMen and the financial 
knowledge which are so peculiarly ar. Jagger's attributes 
to set the. right.-(4) And Jagger hi.self co •• ented, while 
delivering the 1921 Railway Budget, that the financial 
position of the Railway. was one of grave concern, and nothing 
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Administration has only two means of balancing revenue 
and expenditure and those are, firstly, increased rates 
and fares, and secondly, reducing working costs. As regards 
the first, this has been used to almost the fullest extent 
further increases, except perhaps on a few lines, can only 
result in putting a check on production and trade, and on 
travelling."(5) At the end of the previous financial year 
(31st March, 1920) the accumulated deficit on the Railways 
and Harbours had been £1,549,000.(6) In fact the railways 
had been running at a loss for five years (see Appendix 1), 
with the deficit becoming larger and larger. At the same 
• • • • • 
time, this monetary imbroglio was exacerbated by a progress-
ively rapid increase in expenditure and rise in working costs, 
which in turn led to an alerming decline in traffic. Between 
1909 and 1920-21 railway earnings increased by 126 per cent 
while expenditure during the same period increased by 229 
per cent. The actual costs of working the railways were at 
least 75 per cent higher than in 1913-1914.(7) 
While moving that the House of Assembly go into 
Committee on the Estimates of Additional Expenditure to be 
defrayed from the Railways and Harbours Revenue and Loan 
funds, Jagger pointed out that the railways were in their 
present position, "notwithstanding the fact that we have 
increased the rates and fares not less than four times during 
the last seventeen months. The Railways ran at a loss from 
May to October, 1919, but in November rates and fares were 
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£1,750,000.(8) In february and March, 1920, there was 
again a heavy loss. Rates and fares were thus again in-
creased on April 22 to bring in Ll,404,000, but in May and 
June there were 10s8es of over £280,000 - which led to a 
further increase in rates on July 12.(9) Thia increase did 
not even produce a profit - it merely reduced the loss for 
July. On October 3 there was a "general and fairly consider-
able" increase in rates and fares which brought in profits 
for the next three months, but from february onwards there 
was again a loss. And on .arch 10 Jagger was appointed 
to the Cabinet as linister of Railways and Harbours - at a 
time when the railways, in spite of the substantially 
increased rate. outlined above, which had been raised to the 
tune of £7 720 000(10) were run at a very heavy loss. " ) 
In the House of As.embly on larch 21, Jagger pointed 
out that the major increa.e. in expenditure came from the 
increased cost of living allowances, extensions of the eight-
hour day, increases in the price of coal, the additional 
number of trains being run, the Vastly increased cost of 
material. and of running the railways, and the growth of the 
necessity for heavy repair. to rolling stock.(ll) Gross 
expenditure on the railways increased by 96 per cent between 
1914 and 1920-21. In addition it was found to be necessary to 
reduce the rates charged on coal in order to retain the coal 
bunkering and export trade, incurring a loss in revenue of 
£850,000, a .ove which made Jagger unpopular from the start of 
(8 ) Debatea, 22.3.21, p.2l, cols. 1 - 2 
(9) Bulletin of the General lanager of tha South African 
Railwals and Harboura, 10. 24, 1921, p. 135. 
(10) Debates, 17.5.21, p.160, col. 1. 












his ministerial career. Yet he was in most ways the .ort 
or man who would hava inevitably made an unpopular cabinet 
mini.ter. 
Jagger had, throughout hi. parliamentary career, the 
reputation and was known ~y all and sundry ae the .elf. 
appointed -watchdog of the public purse-(12) and as the 
terror or the various linister. of rinance. He wa. particul. 
arly well-known, ror example, for his fierce opposition to 
his own party'. treasurer, Sir Edgar lalton, in Jame.on's 
.inistry or 1904_1908.(13) After hi. elevation to the 
Cabinet C.T •••• ilcock. (Nat. linburg) even expressed hi. 
regret that the House of A.sembly would in future have to do 
wit~out the .inister's trenchant criticism of the Government'. 
financial policy.(14) To put it mildly, Jagger was never a 
In his first major speech in Parliament as linister 
of Railways, Jagger very frankly .~~~_~~ __ ~h.e_/~_.t~,~~i,~~ .s~te of 
railway finances and said that the Railway. had "just got to 
about the end of the tether •••• in the matter of the increase 
of rate. and fares ••••• and the prospects of business before 
the country at the pre.ent ti.e are, to put it mildly, just 
the rever.e of bright ••••• I put it to this Hou.e that it is 
one's first duty to make the railway. pay their way, to make 
ravenue meet expenditure, and not only to do that, but also 
to make provision to wipa out this large accumulated 
_(IS) 
• • • • • He then set out to discover ways and deficit 
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The first steps were to iMpleMent the More obvious 
econoMies such as savings on new works and open lines, as 
well as on rolling stock and sleepers. During the AsseMbly 
debate on the Estimates of .dditional Expenditure to ba 
defrayed from Railways and Harbours Revenue and Loan funds, 
nUMerous speakers criticised previous railway policy and 
SOM., such as ThoMas Boydell (Labour, Durban Greyville), 
suggested that the railway deficit be paid out of general 
revenue. But this was not possible, as Jagger pointed out in 
his reply(16), since it had baen agr.ed at the tiMe of Union 
to keep revenue accounts and railway accounts separate. In 
the sa.e debate eMerged one of the criticiSMS which was 
used ~ nauseaM during the years 1921-4 - that of the railways 
not being run on business principles. This criticiSM derived 
frOM Section 127 of the South Africe Act, part of which 
stated that "the railways, ports and harbours of the Union 
shall be ad.inistered on business principles, due regard 
being had to agricultural and industrial developMent within 
the Union and prOMotion, by .eans of cheap transport)of 
the settleMent of an agricultural and industrial~pulation 
in the inland portions of all provinces of the Union."(17) 
It was even suggested that Jagger hi.self, as a 
great busineSSMan was responsible for this particular clause 
in the Act of Union - by Sir lilliaM MacIntosh (S.A.P.Port 
Elizabeth, South lest)(18) There is, ho.ever, no raal 







22.3.21, p.23, col. 1. 
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Town, 1949), p. 87. 












as Making it clear that the Railways AdMinistration should 
be guided by cOMMercial principles and not the considerations 
which influence the policy of a department of state. He goes 
on to say that the "direction of railway expenditure has 
been frequently determined in accordance with political 
rather than with econoMic or railway considerations~9) 
Ever since 1910 thera had been controversy as to what . 
exactly was meant by "business principles", the particular 
.inister of Railways and Harbours always being guilty of 
"unbusines.like principles" as far as his Opposition was 
concerned. The end result, however, was that the railways 
accounts were kept separate from the general revenue accounts. 
In a sense, however, this was a separation on paper 
only. The Railways were headed by a Cabinet Minister who 
consequently ".ssuMed the function of a representative of 
the financial interests of the central governMent rather 
than those of the head of a great industrial enterprise 
performing a public service".(20) This factor together 
with that of Jagger's own personality - in his narrow 
attituda to financial undertakings - made the whole financial 
situation on the railways More COMplex and difficult to cope 
with, and added greatly to the unpopularity of the Railways 
Administration. Jagger was often criticised, for instance, 
for running the railways "like one of his soft goods depart. 
Ment stores and ignoring the hUMan factor".(2l) 
. Ihile introdUCing his Railway Budget on April 19, 
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in which the Railways found itself. He also reiterate. 
what he ter.ed "further causes for anxiety" - "the advance in 
rates of pay of 8d per day to the artisans granted in January, 
1921, further advances in the rate of local allowances to the 
whole of the staff, and finally on february 7 and larch 14, 
reductions in the rates on bunker coal which are estimated to 
involve the surrender of £1,000,000 per annum·.(22) The 
increase in salaries, for .xample, between 1911.1912 and 
1920-1921 was £10,538,000 or a 181 per cent increase - from 
£5,800,000 to £16,400,OOO.(23) In addition the original 
estimated expenditure for the year was exceeded in almost 
every vote, an excess which totalled £2,185,OOO.(24) To add 
to all this of course was the accumulated deficit at march 
31, 1920 of £1,549,000. Jagger then went on to outline so.e 
of the steps which he hoped to take in order to reduce 
expenditure and generally economise on the South African 
Railways. In the few months since he had become linister of 
Railways there had been wid •• pread speculation as to the sort 
of ~ction which Jagger would take to Wright" the railway. 
finance.. Thu. we find the Rand Daily lail co •• enting that 
" ••••• it see •• probable that the real solvent of the 
financial situation on the railways is to be found in a 
revision of the eight-hour day syste., but to ensure its 
w(25) application on a reasonable basis ••••• Also at this 
ti.e many speakers in parliament expressed the hope that the 
.inister of Railways would make no attacks on the war bonu.(26) 
(22) Debates, 19.4.21, p.a8, col. 2. 
(23) Bulletin of the General Manager, No. 24, p.137. 
(24) Debate., 19.4.21, p.89, col. 1. 
(25) Rand Daily lail, 12.3.21. 
(26) The war bonus or cost of living allowance was granted 
to both railway employees and public servants during 












or the hours of work, as, for exaMple, Boydell and Havenga 
(Nat. fauresmith) did.(27) 
In his Budget speech Jagger announced that he hoped to 
effect econoMies by reducing the cost of living allowance; 
reducing the nUMber of trains owing to falling off in 
passengers, goods and coal traffic; and reducing the repairs 
and Msintenance of buildings and of overtiMe aMongst the 
running staff.(28) The Main econOMY proposed by Jagger was 
to be the gradual abolition of the abnorMal cost of living 
allowance, the process of reduction to be applied being the 
saMe as that in the general governMent service announced by 
Burton in his Budget speech on April 15 - i.e. reductions 
by 25 per cent at the end of every three Months, till at the 
end of the financial year the allowance would disappear 
a1together.(2.) In this way Jagger hoped to save £1,785,000. 
He justified his action in this regard by his assertion that 
the cost of living had fallen. This was quite true (se. 
Appendix Six), yet this particular step was to earn Jagger 
(and the SMuts governMent) More hatred - I use the word 
advisedly - than any other during the tiMe in which he was 
.inister of Railways and Harbours. It led to Mass protests 
allover the country - for exaMple in Pretoria and Durban 
on April 27.(30) It has in fact been asserted that this 
Measure alienated, politically, the bulk of the rank and 
file of railway workers in South Africa.(31) Yet Jagger 
was supported by the press on this question. The Cap. Argus, 
(27) Debates, 22.3.21, p.23, col. 1. 
(28) ill.9. 19.4.21, p.90, col. 2. 
(29) ill.9. 14.4.21, p.9l, col. 3 and 16.4.21, p.83,co1.l. 
(30) Cape TiMes, 28.4.21. 











for example, commented that there were no alternatives, 
unless, indeed, the Government was to adopt the principle 
of wholesale retrenchment which would only add fuel to the 
fire of unemployment.(32) The Cape Times on the other hand 
qualified its approval of "a measure justifiable in the 
present circumstances of the country and in the light of the 
Budget scheme as a whole, but unjustified if it were to be 
synchronised with measurea that would in themselves raise 
the cost of living".(33) Jagger himself later justified thia 
step by arguing that, if they took away the cost of living 
allowance, the wagee of the men would still be 33 per cent 
above what they had been in 1914, while the cost of living 
was only about 23 per cent higher than in 1914.(34) By 
September, 1922, according to Carr, Assistant General 
lanager of the Railways, this measure had reduced railway 
expenditure by three and three-quarter million aterling.(35) 
The Railway Budget debate was a fairly stormy one 
and Jagger was attacked on many counts. The .ajor issue 
remained, however, the reduction in the cost of living 
allowance. It was again Boydell and Havenga who were the 
most trenchant critics of Jaggerts policy. The former in 
fact accused Jagger of merely finding excuses to "take away 
£1,800,000 from our railways and harbours servants".(36) 
Jagger was aleo strongly criticised by Arthur Barlow (lab. 
Bloemfontein North), for introducing this .easure. He warned 
Jagger that any attack on the eight-hour day after this, 
would bring trouble as "it was already being thought by 
(32) Cape Argus, 19.4.21. 
(33) Cape Times, 2.5.21. 
(34) Oebates, 16.3.22, p.66, col. 3. 
(35) Cape Times, 4.9.22. 











railwaYMen that there was an attack on labour".(37) Sir 
Aba Bailey (S.A.P., Krugersdorp), surprisingly, was also very 
critical. He said that after hearing Jagger·s speech one 
felt " ••••• that having lived under Table Mountain (Jagger) 
had a pinched view of the future of South Africa. The 
.inister had no confidence in the future and did not take 
.(38) a broad enough view ••••• 
Thase CO.Ments ara i.portant in that thay provida a 
view of SOMa of Jagger·s worst faults, na.aly, his narrow 
outlook, both politically and econOMically, and also his 
rigid autocratic attitude towards subordinates. Jagger has 
often been praised, quite rightly, for his reMarkable 
aptitude as a busineSSMan but even in this sphere his vision 
reMained a narrow one; "ha had a very liMited outlook on 
commercial matters, an attitude which resulted in his being 
'penny wise, pound foolish,"(31) An excellent example of this 
shortsightedness is provided by Jagger·s strong opposition 
to the establishMent of Iscor in 1928. "He felt that in its 
, 
it~rests protective tariffs would hava to ba established and 
t 
according to h s views (on Frea Trade and Protection), that 
would b. a bad thing for tha country as a whole."(40) Jagger 
was also a very brusque and forthright Man, while in the eyes 
of his terrified .Mployees ha was a true Martinet. His 
impulsiVeness and restless nervous energy pulsated through 
his whole being and he always expected his employees to work 
as hard as he did. "His impetuosity .ada Jagger impatient 





Debates, 14.5.21, p. 155, col. 3. 
Ibid 10.5.21, p. 142, cols. 1, 2. 
Oral Evidenca - M.G.Ashworth, Esq. 
~ R.F.I.Immelman: "Jagger - Man of Iron, Ian of 
Action - An objective study in Biography", 
The Bulletin, Spacial JUbilee Issue, lay, 1958, 
V. IV, No.1, p. 33. 











insensible of hurting people's feelings bry walking roughshod 
over the ••••••• ost people were consequently terrified of 
Jagger, including the .ajority of his staff ••••• larking 
for hi. was not easy. He ruled his staff with a rod of iron. 
In fact he was a representative of the old Victorian 
lai8sez-faire tradition. He did not allow .en under hi. 
much roo. for initiative ..... His attitude to his e.ployees 
was the Victorian paternalistic one ••••• (with) hi.self as 
the owner - Manager keeping his finger on eVerything."(4l) 
It is quita possible, acono.ically, that the Cape 
Argus was correct in saying that Jagger had no alternative to 
reducing the cost of living allowance (other than retrench.entl 
but the fact re.ains that Jagger introduced this measure at 
a difficult time in a roughshod, autocratic manner which was 
likely to cause resentment. "Jagger thought he was running 
a departMent store rather than the great national concern 
that it was.·(42) lany parliamentarians also expressed this 
criticis. - such as Saunders (S.A.P. Natal Coast), who 
"hoped that the .inister would look at the railways not merely 
frOM the point of view of a merchant trading in business, but 
would take the broad view that the railways were the greatest 
factor in the general develop.ent of the country".(43) The 
unfortunate aspect of this attitude of Jagger's was that, in 
terM8 of political tactics, it laid hi. open to widespread 
critici8m. Waterston(lab., Brakpan), for example, criticised 
his over-emphasis on the spirit of "big business" and 
suggested that the consideration should be on the supplying 
of hU.an needs, not the making of hu.an profits.(44) This 
was, however, probably making Jagger into rather more of an 
(41) Im.el.an, The Bulletin, 1958, p. 33. 
(42) I.mel.an files. 
(43) Debates, 12.5.21, p. 149, col. 1. 











ogre than he actually waso The i.portant point is that 
his short-sighted actions laid hi. open to this sort of 
attack. At the annual .eeting of the Executive Council of 
tha N.U.R.A.H.s., for example, a resolution was sent to 
Jagger which stated that railways and harbours servants 
would be prepared "to take drastic .easureS in order ·to 
protect the.selves fro. the predatory operations of certain 
sections of the co •• unity that are apparently disposad to 
exploit the national revenuas to their own particular 
"(45) advantage ••••• In his reply to the Budget Debate 
Jagger defended the reduction of the cost of living allowance 
but did not .ake as strong a case for his actions as was 
probably necassary at the ti.e. He based his defence on his 
esti.atas that, if the cost of living allowance to the 
railway a.ploysas was not taken off, the railways alone would 
hava a deficit in tha current year of £2,400,00~(46) so.e-
thing obviously had to be dona about the finances, but Jagger 
should have been far more circu.spect in his scono.ies 
It would appear that evan as a cabinet .inister he was, 
oblivious to the reactions he caused, particularly if they 
were antagonistic. 
Another important issue with which Jagger had to 
contend in his first few .onths as Minister of Railways and 
Harbours was that of electrification, about which Jagger 
hi.salf was ad.irably non_co •• itta1}47) Thera was a strong 
desire on the part of the "business interests· that the 
Cape Peninsula and the Ourban-Iaritzburg lines be electrified. 
This was opposed by the Mational Party, who felt that railway 
extension on the platt.land was Qf greater importance. 
(45) Cape Ti.es, 17.5.21. 
(46) Debates, 17.5.21, p. 159, col. 1. 











Stanford, for example, discusses S.uts- pro.ises of 
railway .xtension in such a way as to l.ad one to conclude 
that by Oece.ber, 1921 the issue had become quite a sore 
one.(48) In 1920 two .illion pounds had been set aside 
for the electrification of the railways though the sche •• 
had not as yet been imple.ented. Jagger Mentioned the 
possibility of postponing the scheme on account of the 
financial position, and at the sa.e time asserted that "our 
very first consideration as a Railway department should be 
railwayextension".(49) Yet, es the Rand Daily lail 
pointed out, "with so serious a deficit against them it is 
not surprising that the government has decided, with the 
rate of interest at its pres.nt abnormally high figure to 
postpone or at least to curtail its railway construction 
"(50) program.e for another twelve months ••••• , a postpone-
ment announced during the introduction of the Budget debate 
on April 19.(51) Thus neither railway extensions nor 
electrification scheme. were imple.ented in 1921, earning 
Jagger the animosity of both the urban and rural interests. 
In fact between 1920 and 1924 only 233 Miles of railways 
were constructed in South Africa.(52) This particular 
issue caused much dissension between Jagger and Sir Willia. 
Hoy, the latter being of the opinion that "South Africa waa 
in need of railways in an extended way".(53) On the 
question of electrification frankel is highly critical of 
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system where it was possible "for one man, not necessarily 
a railways expert, to decide on millions of railways 
expenditure within a few weeks, without any consultation with 
the Railway Board or the General .anager or statement of 
any reason for his actions n .(54) 
The eight-hour day for railways employees had been 
introduced in lay, 1919(55) but its universal application 
in South Africa was unsatisfactory in many respects. In 
the larger workshops and in the big towns the eight-hour 
day system worked towards efficiency and productiveness. 
On the rural stations, how.ver, this was not the case, 
particularly where only two or three trains passed through 
within a period of eight hours. It was in fact first 
criticised in parlisment by the lational Party in the person 
of Havenga in larch. It was only in July, however, that the 
likelihood of the system's abolition beca.e apparent. On 
July 7, Boydell urged Jagger to look at the Labour Charter 
which had been incorporated in tha Versailles Peace Treaty -
which accepted the principIa of an eight-hour day and a forty-
eight-hour week!56) Other speakers, however, such as 
L.Geldenhuys (S.A.P., Johannesburg North), snd C.E.Nixon 
(S.A.P., Denver), urged Jagger to abolish the system. The 
latter asserted that this would mean a saving of at least 
£200,000 a year to the Railways.(57) On the other hand 
quita a number of speakers, both S.A.P. and lational Party, 
warned Jagger of the resentment and ferment he would cause 
if he did withdraw the eight-hour day system. Jagger's reply 
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it be necessary to interfere with the eight-hour day 
systeM the Administration would not interfere with those 
who had continuous occupation during the eight hours.(58) 
Despite this reasoned and justifiable step, no one 
was prepared for the furore it caused once Jagger had 
abolished the syst •• in August, 1921. Once again he faced 
.assiv. e.bitterment amongst the rai1way.en, earning for 
himself and for the Railways Administration Much unpopularity. 
Yet, as Jagger announc.d in Parliament on July 13, the 
already aerious financial position had worsened considerably 
and since the beginning of the financial year in March, 1921 
the Railways had a further loss of £200,000 a Month owing 
to a falling off of revenue, bringing the total accumulated 
deficit to £3,198,311.(51) In addition the Railways had 
to borrow £1,170,000 from the Treasury to .eet current 
expensea.(60) Thus with the rapidly declining railway 
finances and the rapidly increasing unpopularity of the 
Railways Administration and feelings of vindictiveness towards 
it .mong its •• p10yees, Jagger was faced with a difficult job 
during his next three years in office. It was unfortunate 
that Jagger the bUSinessman, the man who. many thought to be 
"the wrong man to be at the head of a CovernM.nt concern ft (61), 
should have b.en able to deal with the prob1e. of railway 
finances, but not that of embittered .mp1oyees. It was 
probable that had a .an less autocratic or less rigid in his 
ideas been .inister of Railways and Harbours, support for 
the Smuts govern.ent - referred to at this time by the 
president of a railways trade union as a "bunch of dissembling 
(58) Debates, 9.7.21,p. 308. 
(59) ~ 14.7.21, p. 319. 
(60) Bulletin of the Cenera1 .anager, No. 24, p. 137. 
(61) Or. Forsyth, later Labour •• P. for Cape Town Gardens, 











conjurors"(62) - would not have dwindled as rapidly 
as it did. 











NEGOTIATIONS AND DELEGATIONS 
The unpopularity referred to at the end of the 
previous chapter Manifested itself in nUMerous ways, the 
most common being in mass protest meetings by railway employ-
ees, in strongly worded protests to the Minister, and in a 
ren •• ed surge of support for the lational Union of Railways 
and Harbours Services (N.U.R.A.H.S.). The latter developMent 
in particular was of some significance since it marked the 
beginning of a long and bitter caMpaign by the N.U.R.A.H.S. 
against Jagger's administration of the Railways (see 
Chapter III). 
Jagger's measures of economy roused the ire of 
railwaymen allover the country - the major bones of 
contention being, of course, the reduction in the cost of 
living allowanc., the abolition of the eight-hour day and 
the retrenchment of railwaymen. Early in August, 1921, 
discussions took place between Jagger, Sir lilliaM Hoy 
(the General Manager of the South African Railways and 
Harbours), and officials of the South African Industrial 
Federation. In their reports of this Meeting the Cape Times(l) 
and The Star(2) both maintained that it had been Made clear 
by the Railways Administration that reduction in wages and 
retrenchment were under consideration. These reports led 
iMMediately to protest meetings in many railway centres, 
for example, Uitenhage and Salt River(3), but on August 9 
the Railways Administration issued a stateMent denying that 
the retrenchMent of permanent employees was discussed.(4) 
lithin a week, on August 15, reports of wholesale retrenchment 
(1) Cape Times, 6.8.21. 
(2) The Star, 5.8.21. 











at the Bloemfontein railway workshops were announced, and 
5 the furore over SMuts' Minister of Railways continued apace • 
These reports were also denied by the Administration. Soon 
afterwards it was stated that the eight-hour day for 
artisan grades was being abolished, but on this occasion 
Jagger took the sensible step of inviting railways and 
harbours servants to discuss the issue with him in Pretoria -
this was to take the form of a meeting .ith the delegations 
from the various trade unions. Yet even before this meeting 
took place, further protests were held, such as the large 
railwayments meeting in Uitenhage which strongly protested 
against "retrenching men and throwing them into the unemploy-
ment market without consulting the workers' unions ft (6), 
while a si.ilar protest came from the Beaufort West Chamber 
of COllmerce e7 ). 
The meeting with Jagger on August 25 was a crucial 
one as far as relations between management and labour were 
concerned. Jagger managed to alleviate the fears of certain 
sections of labour, particularly the delegation from the 
South African Industrial Federation under Ir. Archie Crawford, 
who aChieved notoriety in labour circles during the 1922 
strike as a "puppet" of the Smuts government and of the 
big mining houses. On the other hand the railwaymen's 
delegation was not i.pressed by Jagger's efforts at 
consultation and, after the Pretoria conference, theY 
issued 8 stateMent refusing to be party to any agreement 
"which would have the effect of bringing the railwaymen 
to a worse position than before the war".(S) The L@bour 
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same grounds - that of the railwaymen being driven back 
to pre-war conditions.(9) They also presented their own 
interpretation of the financial position on the railways 
which, they said, did ~ justify any change in the present 
labour conditions on the railways. Sir lilliam Hoy replied 
to this statement on August 31 stating that the financial 
situation on the railways did necessitate drastic action, 
particularly as "on an average the weakly railway earnings 
have bean £20,000 below the estimate"(lO), while for the 
week ending August 20 they were £35,770 below the estimates~ll) 
The railwaymen's reply was that the estimates were deliber-
ately inflated to produce a "paper deficit", but this seems 
highly unlikely. The railway finances certainly appeared 
to be in a serious position and the Railway Administration 
at last seemed to be making a concerted effort to put their 
case before the railway unions, but they had little success. 
This was mainly because many employees felt that the 
railways' financial position had been made out to be far 
worse than was actually the case. The text of a resolution 
passed by a large number of protesting railwaymen explains 
this attitude clearly:-
"This meeting ••••• having considered the actual 
figures published in government records, relating to the 
financial position of the railways and harbours, expresses 
its indignation that there apparently exists an organised 
attempt to mislead tha country on this matter, presumably 
in order to justify the present programme of retrenchment 
and pulling down the railway workers' standard of living. 
The meeting directs the attention of the public and 
Parliamentary members to this discreditable design, as 

















a paper deficit, especially in the first lean months of 
the financial year; (2) the incidence of an increase 
of about £400,000 in the earnings this year as compared 
with the corresponding period of 1920; (3) the surrender 
of approximately £35,000 weekly in rate reductions to 
big interests~ upon coal, cement, and other similar 
traffic; (4) the huge increase in expenditure for the 
first half of this year, mainly on the inflation of 
supervisory and police establishments; (5) the placing 
of £150,000 every month to reserve funds, while monthly 
deficits are ostentatiously reported; and (6) that 
while there is really a monthly profit, the money is swept 
away on paper to liquidate paper deficits deliberately 
created during the last few years by rate reductions of 
not less than £1,300,000 annually ••••• 
The meeting calls on all railways and harbours 
servants to combine to resist this unwarrantable attack 
on one section of the community in order to procure (1) 
the restoration of the eight-hour day; (2) consolid-
ation of the remaining half of the cost-of-living 
allowances and (3) the abolition of "short time arrange-
"(12) ments for artisans • • • • • 
The resolution shows the very wide credibility gap 
bet •• en the Railway Administration and its employees. 
Despite explaining the current attitudes of the railwaymen, 
the resolution tended to distort the facts. It exaggerates 
the earnings of 1921 over those of 1920 and omits to mention 
that rate reductions 
and so on. Even the 
in a pamphlet issued 
the N.U.R.A.H.S. (13) 
were necessitated by falling traffic 
point of falling traffic was disputed -
by I •• oore, the General Secretary of 
On the question of the railways paying 
interest on non-interest bearing capital in the period since 
Union, the labouritea, especially Boydell, constantly 
expressed their disapproval. In this attitude, however, 
they had the support of the General .anager of the Railways 
"who has for years past put up a very strong protest against 
the decisions of parliament ft (14) to compel the railways to 
(12) Cape Tim.s, 5.9.21. 
(13) W.loore: Nurshs Justifies its Attitude. A survey of 
the Railway and Harbour Finances from the 
Nurah_' Point of View. (Cape Town, 1922) p.3. 











pay this interest. During 1922 Ir. III.A.Martin, President 
of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, made numerous 
attacks on this payment of interest on capital, and this 
opinion was strongly held "in responsible quarters" that this 
charge on the railways was not equitable on any grounds -
"an opinion which has now been endorsed, unanimously, by the 
best commercial intelligence of South Africa".(lS) 
The impression left by Jagger's earlier clumsiness 
and his autocratic manner of introducing measures of economy 
could not b. eradicated. .eetings of railwaymen allover 
South Africa passed unanimous resolutions condemning the 
Railway Administration in general terms, the simmering 
resentment all being directed at Jagger as Minister of Rail-
ways and Hlarbours. There were meetings at Braamfontein 
(5.9.21), De Aar (6.9.21), East london (8.9.21), Upington 
(8.9.21) and Salt River (14.9.21), to name a f.w, all of them 
strongly protesting against Jagger's measures of economy. 
The official announcement of the withdrawal of the universal 
eight-hour day system was finally made on September 9, with 
effect from September 12. There were immediately large 
protest meetings held in Cape Town, Durban, Bloemfontein and 
JOh annesbUrg(16) calling on Jagger to rescind his decision, 
while the Durban meeting also called for Smuts' resignation 
and an immediate election. fiery letters and resolutions 
were once again sent to Jagger(17). In a letter to the 
Cape Times Boydell stated that the "vicious attack on the 
railway workers' standard by the Jagger and Smuts government" 
was entirely indefensible, "except by those junkers of 





















with the working classes of South Africa".(18) 
The Most militant reaction, however, took place in 
Port Elizabeth in the second week of September where 700 
black railways and harbours employees participated in a pass-
ive resistance movement in connection with the new extended 
working hours schedule.(19) Unfortunately, other than the 
newspaper report cited, very little other information on this 
development could be found, and this resistance movement was 
presumably forcefully crushed by the White government. All 
700 were eventually dismissed on September 14. 
The reMaining months of 1921 saw the protests outlined 
above continue on much the same scale. The basic grievances 
concerned diminished bonuses, retrenchment, the cutting down 
of the hours of working of artisans and consequently lessening 
their wages, and the lengthening of the working hours of the 
running and transportation staffs, the government's refusal 
to accept the principle of joint contro~ or to adopt the 
stop-order system in regard to union subscriptions, and the 
"double-trial" system. Even the relatively conservative 
South African Railways and Harbours Salaried Staff Association, 
at its Third Annual Congress, called for a redress of griev-
ances and the investigation of the eight-hour day system 
by a Conciliation Board.(20) 
Accusations of "bad faith" and of contravening the 
Labour Charter continued to be flung at the government with 
increasing intensity. It was again an indication of 
Jagger's insensitiveness that, on the evidence available, , 
these protests and criticisms had little effect on his policy. 




















~allowed very little to distract him from this task. 
lost of the English language newspapers blindly supported the 
government at this time, but there were a number of occasions 
when the activities of railwaymen's trade unions, such as the 
) 
N.U.R.A.H.S., seemed to touch the Cape Times sensitive areas. 
for example, on the question of the governmentts having 
contravened the Labour Treaty, the Cape Times delivered itself 
of a quibbling editorial which maintained that the Government 
was not bound by the Labour Treaty since the Union Parliament 
had never officially ratified the lashington Convention,(2l) 
a technicality which ultimately proved nothing. This partic-
ular weak argument was later taken over by the government 
and used to justify its extension of the eight-hour day 
system. Public f.eling in South Africa on the question of 
the railways and its "big business" Minister ran high in many 
circles. A perusal of the correspondence columns of, say, 
the Rand Daily Mail for September shows a stream of twenty to 
thirty letters protesting against government railway policy, 
with only one really supporting it. 
A new el.ment emerged in the matter of resistance to 
the Railways Administration with the passing of a resolution 
by a .eeting of railways representatives from Johannesburg, 
Braamfontein, Germiston and Pretoria. It stated, inter alia, 
that " •••••• s it is positively known that hundreds will be 
retrenched, this meeting ••••• was resolved to urge the 
immediate introduction of the working to regulation movement, 
delay otherwise being fatal".(22) This new tone of aggresive-
ness was to be repeated again and again over the next couple 
of months, .s Jagger resolutely pursued his policy of economy. 
Shortly after the passing of the resolution quoted above, 
(21) Cape Times, 14.9.21. 











there wa., on September 22, once again a meeting between 
delegations from all organised branches of unions of govern-
ment e.ployee. and the government, represented by Smuts and 
Jagger, where the reductions in the cost of living allowanca, 
retrenchment in the public service and the question of whether 
the governmant had disregarded the reco.mendations of the 
Civil Service Com.ission of Inquiry were discussad.(23) 
There followed a quite re.arkable "ping-pong" battle bat.een 
the government and the delegations as to whether the former 
had promised no further retrench.ent or not. This .is-
interpretation of the proceedings of the meeting, by whichever 
side was responsible, merely served to exacerbate existing 
bitterness. Once again Jagger bore the bulk of the bla.e for 
what the average railwayman consid red to have been his poor 
lot. Jagger had evan become the targat of the daily protest 
meetings of the unemployed in Greenmarket Square, where, on 
one notable occasion, he was referred to as "King Jesus on 
Wheels".(24) 
Once again large protest meetings were held in all 
the larger centre.. The aggressiveness, which had first been 
noticeable a few .eeks earlier, once again revealed itself -
such as at a meeting of Johannesburg govern.ent servants. 
One of the resolutions passed there stated that the meeting 
supported the "Pretoria resolution in regard to the formation 
of a joint Councilor Action, and, unless the Government 
meets its servants in the above matters, acting under an 
extre.e sense of injustice, it pledges itself to support any 
action by various organisations to obtain these". An addendum 
proposed "that this meeting has no confidence in the present 
government.~~~s greeted with applauding assent.(25) 
~ 
(23) Rand Daily lail, 23.9.21. 
(24) Cape Times, 16.8.21. 











At a Cape Town protest lIeeting MOrris Alexander (Constit. 
DeMocrat, Cape Town Castle). warned the governMent that it 
was no use disguising froll thellselves "the fact that there 
was a condition of very serious unrest and dissatisfaction 
throughout all the grad •• of the (public) service at the 
.. (26) present tiM. ••••• Th. eventual Motion adopted at this 
Meeting was evan lIore resolute than the Johannesburg one 
quoted above. Part of it stated that -
If ••••• Further the Meeting realisas that its 
delegates have done everything possible in the 
direction of constitutional representation, and 
considers that the tille for further argullents 
about figures, etc., will not serve a useful 
purpose to Modify the present attitude of the 
GovernMent. As, however. the lIeeting cannot 
accept Gen. SMuts' decision with any degree of 
loyalty, it recom.ends that the various service 
organisations stre~hen and consolidate their 
ranks and elect various cOIlMittees as a council 
of action to consult and advise the s9rvices all 
over the country as to the naxt step to be taken, 
and hereby calls on the wage and salary earners 
in South Africa to support the GovernMent servants 
in their fight against the action of the Govern-
Ment in its deterllination to lower the standard 
of living Df all wage and salary earners. If (27) 
Jagger's reMarkable insensitivity to public opinion 
once again Manifested itself at this critical juncture. At 
the beginning of October ha announced further reductions in 
railway rates for the transpert of bunker and export coal. 
The transportation of coal was for the railways a major 
source of revenue. Yet, with the cliMata of opinion baing 
what it was, this move, which probably had a sound econOMic 
















the "big business" Hoggenheimer interests by a "big business" 
Govern.ent. Tactically)the decision was a major blunder on 
Jagger's part. The popularity of the SMuts government was 
already plummeting and Jagger's policy decision~added to this 
unpopularity. "The government laboured through the morass 
as best it could, unable to foresee the course of events, and 
unable to act consistently. Its chief characteristic in this 
period was its opportunisM and lack of principle."(28) 
The "ping-pong" battle referred to earlier continued 
throughout October. Smuts and the N.U.R.A.H.S., in particular, 
flung accusations of misrepresentation at each other till it 
seemed as though no one knew what had actually occurred at the 
September 22 meeting. Smuts denied the N.D.R.A.H.S' charge 
that he had promised no further retrenchment, and numerous 
contradictory statements were issued on both sides.(29) 
The Railway Administration meanwhile continued apace with its 
economy programm.. During November, 1921, reports of retrench-
ment from allover the country were published in the press. 
After a protest from Alexander on this matter, Jagger 
justified his policy in a telegram which stated that the 
railways' financial position made the retrenchment of 
redundant Men imperative.(30) This once again laid Jagger 
open to the oft-reiterated criticism that he was an extremist, 
taking no cognisance of the claims of railway servants on 
the Administration, nor of the individuals involved nor of 
~la outlook prevalent at the time which held that a government 





At this time Jagger again took an important policy 
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decision which, though applauded by many of the governmentts 
followers at the time, was very short-sighted. On November 
15 South Africa learnt that he had withdrawn "official 
recognition" from the N.U.R.A.H.S., recognition which had 
been extended to them in July, 1918. As has already been 
pointed out there had been constant friction bet.een the 
Railways Administration and the N.U.R.A.H.S. ever since 
Jagger first entered the Cabinet. The resultant deputations 
and various restrained battles through the press were brought 
to • head by this indiscriminate action of Jagger's. At the 
same time it is important to bear in mind that there had also 
been a certain amount of dissension within the ranks of the 
N.U.R.A.H.S., but this was minimal at this time. The 
N.U.R.A.H.S. had admittedly "openly suggested that the rail-
way accounts were being deliberately manipUlated in order to 
give the public an impression that the state of railway 
finances was very much worse than was actually the case~ •• "(3l) 
but this withdrawal of "official recognition", (a nebulous 
term of which even Jagger admitted not knowing the meaning), 
aggravated the relations between the railwaymen and the 
Administration. This was in spite of the official unconcern 
expressed by the N.U.R.A.H.S. Executive. The N.U.R.A.H.S' 
Biennial Congress opened in Bloemfontein about a week later, 
where Hjalmar Reitz, in his opening address, accused Jagger 
of being "unreasonable, petty and shortsighted" in his 
"tendency towards autocracy" while sitting in his ".inisterial 
holy of holie8".(32) 
The Congress later issued a memorandum which clearly 
set out the most important grievances, not only of the 

















withdrawal of the war allowance which the N.U.R.A.H.S. 
alleged had been done without any reference, on the part of 
the government, to the rise or fall in the cost of living; 
the extension of the railw,ymen's hours behond those previous-
ly in force; the insistence on salaried officers working 
Sundays and overti.e with less pay than bafore; the retention 
of the double trial system and the "heartless and iniquitous 
.ethod of retrenchment which is being conducted in the most 
brutal way and with entire callousness •••• "(33) The memo-
randum went on to attack the S.uts Govern.ent for its alleged 
repUdiation of previous agreements on each of the above 
grievance., in the course of which it said that "the Govern-
ment generally and the Railway Administration in particular, 
present themselves to us not a8 a group of men realising 
their national obligations to the whole com.unity, but as a 
group of magnates whose greater care is for the success of 
speculation, and the obtaining of facilities to accumulate 
money".(34) 
The government-supporting press immediately launched 
into a vituperative campaign against the N.U.R.A.H.S. accusing 
it of fomenting discontent, and of "studious insolence", 
while Die Burger merely referred briefly to the N.U.R.A.H.S. 
and then resumed its ceaseless vilification of S.uts.(35) 
The Railways Administration then issued a detailed reply to 
the N.U.R.A.H.S' memorandum denying all the charges made 
against it and asserting that the financial positiOn of the 
railways and harbours demanded "acute watchfulness" since, 
notwithstanding economies already effected by the Administrat-
ion, there had been a loss of over a million sterling for the 













first six months of the financial year.(36) In reply the 
N.U.R.A.H.S. reiterated their arguments - concerning inflated 
estimates, the "unnecessary pay.ents of large su.s of interest" 
(about which even Hoy had COMplained bitterly) and that rate 
reductions on coal surrendered over £30,000 a week - to 
justify its stand on the railway finances. In one sense it 
would appear that the N.U.R.A.H.S. had a strong case for 
their argument on paying interest. Since the whole financial 
position which Jagger had to face was the result of accuMulated 
deficits since 1916-1917, therefore why not have it counter-
balanced by the aCCUMulated surpluses of the previous years 
instead of paying those surpluses over to general revenue. 
Fuel was added to this already volatile situation when Smuts, 
addressing the Free State Congress of the South African Party, 
indicated that it was the govern.entts intention to increase 
working hours and reduce salaries.(37) At the end of 
November yet another deputation waited on Jagger and requested 
categorical replies o questions which they had prepared 
concerning the various grievances of the railwaymen. 
Included in these questions was one concerning the 
colour bar and for the first time we see Jagger concerned 
with policy and problems of some direct long-term significanc~ 
rather than .erely within the limited frame of reference of 
the early nineteen-twenties. The N.U.R.A.H.S. wanted Jagger 
to state categorically whether White labourers on the rail-
ways would continue to be protected by a minimum rate of pay, 
and by control of the partial employment of Coloured labour 
in "white occupations". ~agger's secretary replied a few 
days later stating that it was not possible for the 

















and other conditions".(38) Thi. oMinously equivocal raply 
foreshadowed evan more unpopularity for Jagger, since the 
issues of colour and race, though not yet dOMinant in South 
African politics, were then, as now, very explosive issues. 
The r_nk and file on the railway. were horrified by this 
reply to their coaplaint. 
The whole question of black labour on the railways 
during Jagger's adMinistration is shrouded in somewhat 
peculiar circumstancas. As far as some commentators ara 
concerned the period during which he was minister of Railways 
and Harbours definitely saw the introduction of black labour 
on the railways. O'Oowd talks of Jagger "admitting 
additional non-European wOrkerS",(39) the Railway Review 
~ 
said that the white man was baing displaced by the uncivilised 
native in the Service"(40) and van Rooyen asserts that "in 
die jare 1920-24 in die spuorwe; is blankes deur naturelle 
vervang as deel van 'n besuinigingsbeleid. Die ontevreden-
heid hierdeur veroorsaak het na die blanka werkers in ander 
bedry.a versprei, an onder die Transvaalse mynwerkers het 
beroering gekoM. n (4l) Die Burger, when referring to the 
railways, an occurrence which was rare, seldom Mentioned tha 
issue of black labour. It usually referred to Jagger's need 
"to cleanse the Augean stables" of the South African Railways' 
financial position. The files of Die Burger for this period 
are filled with countless referencas to this iMage of the 
railway financas, coupled with laudatory references to Jagger 
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" • • • • • Ons het oor die algemean geen klagte op die manier 
waaroor ons Spoor.a; bestuur word nie. minister Jagger is 'n 
man van groat bakwaamheid wat met hart en siel werk vir die 
belange van die groot bedryf "(42) • • • • • 
As far as the English press was concernad there were, 
insofar as ODuld be ascertained, no references to this 
question, with the exception of a report in the Cape Times 
after Jaggar had baen a Cabinat minister for less than a 
fortnight. The report stated that the Cape Town branch of 
the Provincial lative lational Congress had very strongly 
protested against the "unsympathetic attitude of the Railway 
Administration" which was considered to be "an indirect 
"(43) project to replace native labour by poor whites •••• 
Thus as far as unofficial sources were concerned it 
was difficult to detarmine whether or not Jagger had replaced 
whites by blacks for reasons of economy. Other than the sort 
of vague references quoted above, there is no more information 
in unofficial sources. In parliament Jagger consistently 
denied undercutting the security of the .hite railway 
•• ployee. Addressing a meeting at De Aar in September, 1922, 
Jagger statad that at one stage white gangers had been removed 
from the branch lines (which wer. not paying) to the main 
lines. "This had however caused some misunderstanding and he 
had given instructions that no further transfers of this 
nature should take placa."(44) This particular practice 
was rarely mentioned in the press and could not have been 
very widespread. In parliament, however, it was brought 
up from time to time, Walter madeley (Labour, Benoni) being 
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In fact the whole question of black labour on the 
railways was seldom mentioned in parliament except fcamthe 
labour benches. Dr. Visser (Nat. Vrededorp), objected to 
coloured men being employed as checkers at the Johannesqurg 
Kazerne(46), Col. Creswell (lab. Stamford Hill), criticised 
Jagger on the grounds that it was a "departure from the 
Minister's previous policyft(47) and J. de Waal (Nat.Piquet-
berg), accused Jagger of wanting to force whites off the 
railways and into the towns.(48) Three South African Party 
members - L. Moffat (Queenstown), P.S.Ci11iers (Hopetown) and 
Sir David Harris (Beaconsfield) - and one Labour member, 
J. Stewart (East London), appealed to Jagger to employ more 
black labour on the railways. Cilliers' appeal was on the 
grounds of compassion for the whites working on the railways 
who. he felt ought to be placed on the land(49); those of 
1"0 f fat ( 50 ), H a r r i s ( 51) and S t e war t ( 52 ) 0 nth e g r a u n d s 0 f 
economy. In his replies to both pleas and criticism on this 
issue, Jagger never really gave a clear impression of whether 
he was replacing whites by blacks or not. 
The official figures for the numbers of white. and 
blacks .mployed on the railways are no more illuminating 
than the vague remarks mentioned above, in that these figures 
are remarkably contradictory. What i! without doubt, however, 
is tha~ these figures do not show any startling changes as 
the percentages of whi tes and blacks are concerned._ (Se. 
Appendix Seven) - notwithstanding some of the vitriolic 
(46) Debates, 2.6.21, p. 210, col. 3. 
(47) Ibid 13.3.23, p. 146, col. 3. 
(48 ) IbId 22.6.23, p. 416, col. 3. r9 ) Ibid 23.5.22, p. 229, col.l and l3.3.23,p.146,col.2. 50~ IbId 21.3.22, p. 76. col. 1. 51 Ibid 19.5.22, p. 219, col. 3. 










SMUT3' "'.VI 'HTE" SOUTrl hfll"!iCA ---------------._-
---·--·---TIiiu~Aci~· P-'-'-II [,"O-"-~ i: .... 1L-'-'-~: y.~-,-ND-iiA.iBOURS.----·---·-
"111 ~" Al!" "~·,u,, O~ "'" 0YQ""'.'~" ,," u.".,,;,~. 
(>", ...... " YO" un~~ ... I~~.'" 
A_MI., , ' •• ~" ... foo' t ~ ". U".ift'".~, J~~_.<'" 
~"tn~ •• ,! "). ""'~". "OT~' 











propaganda that was on occasions churned out, as, for 
example, in the cartoon opposite. Yet as Jagger himself 
said "in 1912 tha proportion of Europeans to the total 
employed on the railways was 51.4, and in January, 1924, the 
proportion was 51.3".(53) Ultimately it is not really 
important whether Jagger did use black men in "white man's 
jobs" or not. There is more significance in the fact that at 
the time there was a widespread belief that he ~ replaced 
whites by blacks, which consequently added greatly to his 
unpopularity and that of hia party. 
This whole question of black labour on the railways 
was thus initially aired by the N.U.R.A.H.S., which, although 
a white union, seamed to admit coloured workers into separ-
ately organised branches. In fact in lay, 1919, the N.U.R.A.-
H.S. even held a meeting for black rai1waymen to protest 
against the decision of the Railway Administration "to limit 
the payment of the coloured war bonus to the Cape Coloured 
staff, as distinct from Indians and Natives~) Tha 
N.U.R.A.H.S. had, in 1921, initiated and co-ordinated strong 
opposition to Jagger's policies. 1921 was an extremely 
difficult year for Jagger, and for South Africa. Addressing 
a N.U.R.A.H.S. meeting in Cape Town, MOrris Alexander said 
that 1921 "had been a nightmare, with four milestones in 
the easy descent to Avernus, the withdrawal of the eight-hour 
day, the withdrawal of the war bonus, withdrawal of official 
. "55 
recognition of the N.U.R.A.H.S. and wholesale retrenchment •• 
The hardship causad by these economies were all blamed on 
Jagger and his name is today still remembered amongst railway-
men with extreme dislike. 
(53) Oebates, 27.3.24, p.1163. 
(54) P.L.Wickins: "The Industrial and Commercial Workers' 
Union", (Ph.O.Thesis, U.C.T., 1973), footnote,p.61. 











These economies on the railways should Rot, however, 
be seen as harsh, isolated measures implemented by a fanatical 
ainistar of Railways. The whole South African economy was 
suffering under the effects of a post"war depression. As was 
pointed out earlier the gradual withdrawal of the cost of 
living allowanca applied to the whole public service as well 
as to the railways. And on lay 10, 1921, for axample, 
retrench.ant in the postal service seemed likely, according 
to an announcement in the Cape Times. Yet, when it was 
eventually announced officially, only 114 postal officials 
were affected.(55)less than one per cent of the total labour 
forca of the post office. In October, 1921, there was a 
considerable fracas in the Transvaal when prominent officials, 
including some inspectors, were retrenched from the Transvaal 
Education Department.(55) This was intensified a few weeks 
later by a rumour strongly prevalent among public servants 
that an all-round percentage reduction in salaries would 
take place throughout South Africa early in 1922.(57) Lata 
in Nove.ber retrench.ent began in the Defenca force, and it 
was later announced that 40 permanent force officers (1nclud-
ing four brigadier-generals) and some 59 warrant officers and 
N.C.O's had been retired from the force "owing to the serious 
financial situation of the Union".(5B) During the 1922 
parliamentary session the Secretary for Defence, Sir Roland 
Bourne, announced a policy of drastic retrenchment in the 
Defenca forca.(59) Then in August, 1922, "consternation 
spread through the ranks of bank officials throughout South 
Africa due to fear of retrenchment, such as is at present 
taking place in the lational Bank •••• "(60) 















The end result of all these measures was to add to 
unemployment, with an attendant alarming increase in poor 
whiteism. The general growth of discontent and insecurity 
rapidly unde~cut much of the support of the Smuts government, 
particularly in the urban working class areas. At the same 
time, as DtDowd points out, there were a number of incidents 
which intensified opposition to the government. This was 
especially true of What was then referred to as "Iative 
Affairs". The memory of 71,000 black miners striking in 
february 1920 on the Rand was still Vivid.(6l) In 1921 
there were strikes in Port Elizabeth which, like that of 
february 1920, mas bloodily put down. 
In May 1921 there was the infamous Bulhoek incident 
in which scores of blacks were shot, after months of inept 
maneouvring by the government. Smuts, in particular, 
acquired a reputation for bloodshed and staunch support for 
"big business" rather than the common man. The blame for 
all the blunders and economic ills of the country landed 
squarely on the government. In Cape Town, for example, there 
were the regular and vociferous meetings held in Greenmarket 
Square by the unemployed of the City, at which the government 
(especially Smuts and Jagger) continually bore the brunt 
of the bitterness and resentment of the men. 
In July, 1921, disputes between the Chamber of mines 
and the miners began to be reported, but the initial question 
of cutting wages was settled on August 5.(62) The furore 
on the railways on the question of black labour should be 
seen in relation to developments on the Rand mines between r 
labour and management. In November, 1921, the Chamber of 
(61) O'Dowd: ~. £!i, p.55. 











Mines, on the recommendations of the Low Grade Mines 
Commission(63) proposed that the status Quo Agreement -
which regulated black-white ratios on the mines - be 
abolished. A further wage cut had already baen proposed 
the previous month. It was this proposal which led to the 
initial disputes with tha Chamber of Mines and, ultimately, 
to the 1922 Strike. Thus the railwaymen's fear of black 
labour usurping their own livelihood was on very much 
the same level as one of the major factors which led to 
the miners' strikes of 1922. 
A large portion of South Africa was thus, at the' 
start of 1922, alienated from the government and generally-
resentful. The prospect of governing for Smuts' cabinet,-
and for Jagger in particular, could not have been very 
attractive. 











RAILWAY fINANCES AND LABOUR RELATIONS 
The Most iMportant event of 1922 was very obviously 
the Rand Strike. What effect did this have on the railways? 
It affected the railways in two ways - its inco.e and ita 
ataff. The accuMulated deficit on the railways at larch 31, 
(1) 1921, was £2,598,883. As has already been pointed out, 
by June another £600,000 deficit was recorded. The Most 
iMportant financial details as regards Jaggerts justification 
for his policy of econo.y have been discussed in the preceding 
chapters. It would appear that - disregarding arguments 
concerning "inflated estimates" and "paper deficits" - in 
1921 the actual earnings of the railways exceeded the 
ordinary working expenditure by three and a half million 
pounda.(2) from April to July, for example, Jagger's first 
months after the 1921 Railway Budget, the railway earninga 
exceeded expenditure by £1,321,000 which was increased to 
£1,419,000 by other miscellaneous receiPta.(3) However it 
was payments on the cost of living allowance and interest 
chargas on capital that gave the railways an accumulated 
deficit of £3,336, 00 on July 31, 1921. As yet Jagger had 
not managed to cut down hia expenditure however, for it 
had increased by 0.74 per cent over the au. for the sa.e 
period of the previous year.(4) 8y September the accu.ulated 
deficit was £3,500,000 and the Railway Administration was 
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Jaggar explained this rise as baing tha ra8ult of tha 164 
per cent or £10,000,000 wages increase 8ince 1913 while in 
the sawe period railway rates had only increasad by 48 per 
cant. "The future raising of railway rates would simply 
waan discouraging production, with a further falling off in 
the ravenue of the country.M(6) There was howevar a gradual 
improve.ent in the position from than onwards. By October 
the axce •• earnings over total working expenditure were 
about £2,300,000, ,et because of interest charges and 
accuwulated deficits the deficit reached £3,700,000 by October 
31(7) and £3,770,000 by Novamber.(8) lithout taking into 
account tha charge8 for the Betterwent and Pension funds, 
the period from April to November, 1921 saw a .onthly loss on 
the railways ranging frOM £268,000 in lay to £50.000 in 
Nove.ber.(9) In Oacember, 1921, and January, 1922 however, 
the railways showed profits of £63,000 and £68,000 respective-
ly. But the econo.ias effectad could not prevent a further 
los. of £235,000 in february as a result of a serious fall in 
revenue because of the Strike. There would thus appear to be 
a great deal of truth in Jagger's assertion that had the 
Strike not occurred the railways quite probably would have 
paid their way fro. December, 1921 until the eAd of the 
financial year.{lO) Jagger had budgeted for a deficit of 
£3,144,710(11) but was finally confronted by one of 
£4,189,374(12) despite a saving of £953,000 on the esti.ate~(13 
(Burton, linister of finance in his 1921-1922 Budget aimed 
at a deficit of £189,000 but instead faced ona of almost 
!;l Caee Ti.a., 22.12.21. Ibid 27.12.21. 
:~ T6Id 28.1.22 • . 1.5.22. Ibid 
(10) Debates, 21.2.22, p.7, col. 1. 
(11 ) U.G. 18 - 21, p.2. 
(12) U.G. 37 - 22, p.19 & U.G.46 - 23, p .1. 











£1,400,000.(14) J The Strike eventually lost the railways -
about half a .illion pounds.(lS) nThe cu.ulative effect' 
of three .onths of strikes and disturbance in the .unicipal~ 
industrial centre. of the Union, following so aoon on the 
acute depression of the preceding twelve months, disturbed' 
the whole econo.ic systeM of the country, and led to acute' 
une.ploy.ent and to lack of confidence and further depression\ 
in trade and industry.n(16) 
The close relation of the Strike to the question of . 
Black labour on the railways has been .entioned. Both the 
.iners and railway.en felt forced to fight "to maintain a 
Ihite standard of living" - basically to prevent the removal-
of the colour bar. A meeting of railwaymen in Braa.fontein_ 
in early January, 1922 promised to assist the miners in their/ 
struggle and called for a ballot to be taken for direct , 
action "in order to bring force to bear on the Government ~ 
to reintroduce the eight-hour day and to stop i.mediately 
further retrench.ent".(17) This enthusiasm for taking a 
ballot was not shared by other branches, such as that at 
Ger.iston(lS) whila the Oa Aar Railway.an, for example, 
wished to arranga so.e sort of confrontation immadiate1y. 
At the aame time the N.U. R.A.H.S. reopened their campaign and 
.aked Jagger for further consideration of their grievances, 
~ 
but, other than .ora deputations to Pratoria and a fruitless 
set of negotiations, nothing ca •• of this. Consequently the 
call for joining the miners' strike baca.a stronger in so •• 
quarters but, according to the Cape Time. "inquiries fro. 
many parts of the Union on the railway .ituation indicate 
(14) Debates, 6.5.22, p.18S. 
(IS)!!!! 14.3.23, p.149, col. 3. 
(16) U.G. 37 - 22,p.2. 
(17) Cape Ti.es, 7.1.22. 











that at present the great majority of the railway •• n are 
not in favour of a general sympathetic strike n .(19) In a 
speech in Johannesburg Mr. I •• oore, General Secretary of the 
N.U.R.A.H.S., asserted that the railway.en were dissatisfied 
and restless and that 
"there was no disguising the fact that the 
loyalty of the railwaymen had broken down • • • 
He considarad that there would be distinct 
pre.sure on the railway union. to take ad-
vantage of the present crisi., not only in 
thair own intarasts, but becausa the railw.y-
.an were entirely sympathetic to the ai.s 
of the miners. They recognised the way tha 
miners had been treated presented the sa.e 
autocratic features which had characterised 
the treatment of the railwaymen by the 
Government generally and by Mr. Jagger in 
particular and he thought it quite possible 
that the present position would force a 
consol7'tion of forcas."(20) 
This consolidation of forces never actually materialised 
but throughout January and rebruary of 1922 rumours circulated 
the Reef that the railway.en were about to throw in their lot 
in sympathy 8ith the ganeral body of strikers. The General 
Sacretary of the N.U.R.A.H.S. addressed meetings of railwaymen 
in most of the larger centres, urging them to close their 
ranks to ensure the "solidarity for the cause". Early in 
January the South African Industrial rederation (representing 
the strikers) mada strong representations to the N.U.R.A.H.S. 
asking them to refuse to move trains containing Nativ.s from 
the mines. Certain National Party members of parliament 
also addressed meetings organised by the N.U.R.A.H.S. but 
(19) Cape Ti.es, 14.1.22. 











spoke against a strike being declared at the present stage 
by the railway employees.(2l) These rumours of an imminent 
railway strike were quite logical in a sense, especially 
when on. considers the atmosphere in the country a' the time 
.s well a8 the general antagonism amongst the railwaymen. 
The railways was an enormous organisation and with the many 
different unions opinions on striking really ~ divided, 
and for these reasons, together with the fact that the 
I.B.R.A.H.S' finances were in a somewhat difficult state(22) 
the railwaymen never did achieve anything approaching 
unanimity on the strike issue. In the railway workshops in 
Pretoria, for example, a ballot resulted in 431 voting against 
a strike and 425 for one.(23) Seventy-nine men in these 
workshops did at a later date co •• out on strike for thr.e 
days.(24) Th. other areas where a substantiel number of •• n 
want on strike in .arch, 1922 were Durban (203 man), 
Ger.iston (79), Braa.fontein and Kazerne.(25) Of the 412 
who went on strike 385 were taken back into tha service.(26) 
South African Party, lationalist and Labour speakers at one 
stage all appealed to Jagger to reinstate all those who had 
been on strike on the sam. basis .s before especially as some 
had lost up to twenty-five years' superannuation money. This 
he predictably refused to do. The consequent divisions in 
the service ran d.ep and served to exacerbate tensions and 
bitterness already present among the railwaymen as a result 
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Thus it was that the strike affected the railways. 
Its iMportance was that it increased the financial probleMs 
af the railways and consequently made Jagger's attachment to 
and pursuit af economy even stronger. In addition it 
crystallised and mobilised much of the simmering opposition 
to Jagger as linister of Railways and Harbours. During the 
strike there were quite a number of meetings at which very 
strong criticiSM of Jagger was expressed. The major political 
importance of the strike however, was that it hastened the 
demise of the Smuts government - mainly through the alien-
ation of White labour, which led ultimately to the establish-
ment of the ~act, the largest single factor in Smuts' 
defeat.(27) 
One of the Most important effects of the strike on 
the railways was that it brought about the final, irreconcil-
able split between the Railway Administration in general and 
Jagger in particular and the N.U.R.A.H.S. As has already 
been emphasised, the relations between Jagger and the 
N.U.R.A.H.S. had been somewhat stormy ever since he assumed 
office as Minist r of Railways and Harbours. It was indeed 
a turbulent association from the start. It was in fact 
highly unlikely that Jagger and the N.U.R.A.H.S. could ever 
have associated amicably with each other. Jagger was always 
~ 
consevative and authoritarian and did not understand 
~ (28) 
cOMproMise ,while the N.U.R.A.H.S· Executive was 
generally socialist and relatively left-wing in relation to 
Jagger and the Railways Administration. The two sides, 
basically incompatible, did not understand each other. Jagger 
thought the forthright criticism of the N.U.R.A.H.S. Made 
theM agitating subversives, while the N.U.R.A.H.S. quite 
(2287) O'oowd, g£ cit, p.56. 












undarstandably could never fathom that negotiation and 
collective bargaining .ere totally foreign and incompre-
hensible to 3agger tha martinet, who expected submission 
from all subordinatas. Thus.a find E.H.Jones, Assistant 
General Secretary of the N.U.R.A.H.S, relating to a meeting 
of rai1waymen what he considered to be his astounding 
treatment by Jagger in nnegotiation n.(29) 
The conflict dated back to the days of the Botha 
Government, but the Union's unpopularity with the government 
and the "big business" interests ste •• ed from loore's 
activitie.,i •• arly 1921)when he had advised members of the 
N.U.R.A.H.S, how to vote during the general alection. 
Jagger's first antagonistic mova was his policy decision on 
the stop-order systa. of collecting subscriptions for trade 
unions. Ha refused to implement this system as well as that 
00) of "joint control" as far as the N.U.R.A.H.S. were concerned. 
The ensuing negotiations, attacks and counter-attacks of 1921 
have already bean discussed. Anothar factor which ought to 
be emphasised is the policy towards tha N.U.R.A.H.S. follo.ad 
by the rank and file of the South African Party. Generally, 
they vigorously supported Jagger's strong lin.. Thus.a find 
R.I.Close (S.A.P., Rondebosch) declaring that "a mora 
damnabla doctrine than .hat appeared in the N.U.R.A.H.S' 
and their official organ had nevar been preached n .(3l) He 
accused the. of doing a malignant disservice to the people 
of South Africa. Jagger him.elf accused the. of endeavouring 
to undermine the loyalty of the staff officas. The national 
press was generally very critical of the N.U.R.A.H.S· policy. 
The Cape Times, for axample, commented that "the dictators 
(29) Cape Times, 12.12.21. 
(30) Debates, 18.3.21, p.l?, col. 3. 











who ~irect N.U.R.A.H.St policy are leading their organisation 
straight for disaster and the few remaining dupes of their 
embittered political partisanship are paying heavily for the 
doubtful privilege of being personally involved in the 
inevitable crash n .(32) These attitudes continued throughout 
the period under review, the withdrawal of "official 
recognition" on November 15 not really making any difference 
to the situation, other than alienating even further the 
hard core of the N.U.R.A.H.S' supporters. Shortly after 
this event the N.U.R.A.H.S. published a pamphlet called 
"Working to Regulations n which annoyed Jagger and the 
Railways Administration a great deal, for it recommended a 
policy of going slow in order to eliminate miners' grievances. 
On 18 April, 1922, the Railways Administration decided that 
unless the manual was officially withdrawn the Administration 
would have nothing further to do with the N.U.R.A.H.S. On 
13 July the N.U.R.A.H.S. complied with this demand and in 
September Jagger promised to review the question of official 
relationships. Jagger then asserted that what had caused 
this situation between his Department and the N.U.R.A.H.S. 
was "the policy pursued by the N.U.R.A.H.S. of undermining 
the loyalty of the staff and the discipline of the Admini-
stration and the general abuse which had been poured on the 
Administration ••••• "(33) 
The final split, however, came as a result of the 
strike. During the strike the General Secretary had made ( 
himself extremely unpopular by addressing meetings, urging 
( 
solidarity and sympathy with the miners. loore, in doing so,1 
had antagonised many old N.U.R.A.H.S. supporters. In fact I 
the Braamfontei" branch defected from the N.U.R.A.H.S. in ( 
(32) Cape Times, 14.3.23. 











April, 1922.(34) Later in the year the .atal branches 
withheld subscriptions from the Ceneral Council of the 
(35) N.U.R.A.H.S. Before Parliament asse.bled Mloore sent 
out a circular which stated that "our ranks are depleted 
and ••••• a good deal of energy is being wasted in internal 
recrimination from certain points of view·.(36) The Union 
was in an uncomfortable situation by early 1923. In the 
House of Assembly on .arch 14, 1923, Colonel Creswell 
(Labour, Stamford Hill), leader of the Labour Party, during 
the Co •• ittee Stage of the Railways and Harbours Appropriation 
(Part) Bill, asked Jagger what his grounds were for refusing 
(31) to reoognise the N.U.R.A.H.S. in any way. To justify 
his stand of having nothing further to do with the N.U.R.A.H.S. 
Jagger virtually accused loore of attempted murder and 
consequently caused an uproar in the House of Assembly and 
in the national press in the days that followed. He accused 
.oore firstly of using the strike as an opportunity for the 
railwaymen all to join forces and use the N.U.R.A.H.S. as a 
means of protest. But the major sensation was caused when 
Jagger accused Moore of furnishing .arten mulder (Johannesburg 
Secretary of the N.U.R.A.H.S.) with the times of train 
arrivals on the Rand, trains on which the General manager of 
the Railways and on which Ceneral Smuts had travelled. It 
was then alleged that Mulder had given the details to 
fisher (later a leader of the Council of Action during the 
strike), who had dynamited the railroad, but Smuts had 
fortunately left the train at Potchetetroom. In a letter to 
(34) Rand Daily Mail, 19.4.23. 
(35) Cape Times, 1.2.23. 
(36) Ibid 14.3.23. 











the Cape Times .oore immediately denied the charges, stating 
that he had never met nor communicated .ith risher.(38) 
1U1der did the same in a letter to the Rand Daily lail.(39) 
In the ensuing debate in parliament Jagger was 
attacked on all sides for his accusations. Creswell question-
ed h~s sources and then attacked him for using a system of 
espionage af Trade Unions.(40) Smuts replied to Creswell's 
tirade at length but actually said very little other than to 
support Jagger's assertions. There followed a long stream 
of .ationalists and Labourites all of whom either attacked 
Jagger or pleaded for a parliamentary select cammittee to go 
into the affair in order that Moore might either be 
prosecuted or declared innocent. Jaggeres initial claims 
had been made aa though he had documentary evidence for them, 
but after a somewhat fiery debate he admitted(4l) that he 
had deduced loor.'s guilt from the telegrams which had been 
sent to Johannesburg by him. Smuts himself replied to the 
debate and, after a very torrid exchange with Creswell 
refused to appoint a select committee on the matter -
interestingly enough, on the grounds that loore might 
incriminate himself before a select committee, which was not 
a competent body to investigate criminal charges. (It is 
tantalising to think of what Smuts' latter-day disciples 
~ on the Schlebusch Commission would think of this argument!) 
The debate was then adjourned. 
ror the next few days the press was filled with 
references and comments on the "Moore-Jagger" affair. The 
Cape Times and Cape Argus, predictably, supported Jagger 
(38) Cape Times, 16.3.23. 
(39) Rand Daily lail, 15.3.23. 
(40) Debates, 15.3.23, p.154, col. 1. 











very strongly, whila the Rand Daily lail called for an 
iMpartial investigation into the whole affair.(42) ~ Burger 
on the other hand very strongly criticised Jagger for his 
attack on loore in parliament.(43) When the parliamentary 
debate on the matter was resumed on larch 16, Jagger once 
again seemed to have backed down. He stated that the only 
incontrovertible evidence which he had was that of the 
telegra.s and that "anyone could infer what they wished -
he would make no charges". He conveniently forgot about his 
own pointed conclusions of the previous debate and went on to 
outline, as he saw them, the relations between the N.U.R.A.H.S. 
and the Railway AdMinistration since the granting of 
"official recognition in 1918".(44) Jagger particularly 
objected to the attacks on him in the Railway Review frOM 
which he quoted .any examples. For instance the Review 
had ~old the railwaymen that "with the advent of Ir.Jaggerts 
business outlook the railways' and harbours' servants had 
to sit up and pay attention, and had to decide whether to 
fight for a standard of living or be ground to the level of a 
poor paid servant". Jagger objected to the N.U.R.A.H.S. 
having taken an active and aggreJ'~ve part in converting their 
c (45) 
society into a political Machine. It was nevertheless a 
forceful speech in a rather "drum-beating" manner, quite 
unlike Jegger's usual restrained, humourless style. 
But, as Creswell rightly pointed out i.mediately after 
Jagger had spoken, while the latter had virtually denounced 
railwaymen daring to take part in politics, what of the 
l :~~ 44) 
(45) 
Rand Daily lail, 19.3.21. 
Burger, 16.3.23. 
Debates, 17.3.21, p.16l, cols. 2 - 3. 











position of the General manager - this was a telling paint 
as Sir lilliam Hoy was all too often associated with the 
South African Party. What Jagger did not realise, however, 
was that because of its size and the large number of se.i-
skilled Whites employed, the Railways could never really 
function in a political vacuum.(46) (Patterson also 
maintains that at its foundation the Afrikaner Broederbond 
t h d it f th "1 )(47) seeMS 0 ave rawn .any recru s rom e ra~ ways. 
Creswell also accused Jagger of "whittling away" what he had 
asserted previously.(48) There followed two further very 
lengthy debates on the matter, both involving an unusual 
amount of perennial South African political rhetoric about 
"agitators" and "subversives" on the one hand from the South 
African Party, while on the other the Nationalists and 
Labourite. took a very strong line on the Rule of Law which 
Jagger, they alleged, wa. contravening. The end result of 
the controversy in parliament was that Jagger remained 
adamant in his refusal to appoint a select committee, and 
the opPOSition failed in its attempts to force Jagger to 
admit .aking a aistake, and thus the parliamentary debate 
ended. 
The repercussions outside~'parlialRent are more 
i.portant perhaps, yet .ore difficult to assess. It is quite 
possible that the whole affair was a concerted effort on the 
part of Jagger to break the Union, through his&tack on 
Boore. The effect certainly was to place the N.U.R.A.H.S. in 
an uproar. Shortly before Jagger's attack on moore the 
N.U.R.A.H.S. was in a somewhat difficult position, with a 
(46) S. Patterson: The last Trek - A Study of the Boer 
People and the Afrikaner lation. 















sharp drop in both finances and membership. Jagger's attack, 
however, seemed to give the organisation new life - as one 
pro.inent Trades Union official had warned it might on 
larch 17, that is, a few days after the initial attack on 
moore in the House of Assembly. This official declared that 
unless the stat.ments were substantiated up to the hilt (by 
Jagger) the inevitable effect would be to rally Trade Unionists 
round Ir. loore and very considerably increase the membership 
(49) of the N.U.R.A.H.S. from the evidence of the active 
lampooning in their newsletters and magazine, the fiery 
resolutions sent to the press, and the support given to 
moo r e , i t w'O u 1 d s... t hat the N. U • R • A • H • S' sup p 0 r twa s 
increased by Jagger. Early in April, for example, the 
Executive Council of the N.U.R.A.H.S., meeting in Bloemfontein, 
unani.ously accepted loore's denials and reappointed hi. 
General Secretary of the Union.(50) This unani.ity did not 
last very long however. By July of the same year, the 
organis.tian had split in half, and in fact ceased to be lhe 
threat to Jagger and the Railway Administration which it had 
once been. A.L.Clark, President of the N.U.R.A.H.S., 
resigned and became General Secretary of a new body, the 
Brotherhood of Railways and Harbours Servants (S.A.) The 
rapid deterioration in the N.U.R.A.H.S' support is well 
illustrated by the fact that on larch 16 the Durban Branch 
of the N.U.R.A.H.S.had supported loore and attacked Jagger 
for his allegations. In early June, however, the Durban 
Branch resigned ~ bloc from the N.U.R.A.H.S. in protest 

















in importance and "died a natural death in the late 
twenties-.(5l) 
The 1922 parliamentary session proved to be yet 
another ordeal for Jagger. All his measures of economy 
came in for very severe criticism. Jagger was continually 
castigated as the railwayman's oppressor. On March 21, 
Jagger announced the Railways and Harbours Estimates for 
1922-1923 which showed a decrease of £2,631,000 on those of 
the previous year.(52) Once again he was severely criticised 
for having issued such high estimates the previous year, 
which, it was alleged, produced an artificial deficit.(53) 
As always the Labour Party, the N.U.R.A.H.S. and various 
other discontented railwaymen attacked Jagger because it was 
felt that railway revenue was being "bled by the Treasury 
quite illegitimately" in the contributions .ade by the 
railways to the Renewals and Betterment fund. Snow (Labour, 
Salt River), for example, held that "the railways were not 
really losing money; t was .ainly a paper debt, and they 
were paying interest on a sum on which, the General Manager 
held, the railway. should not pay".(54) Throughout the 
session Jagger's own words fro. his "Iessage to the Staff" 
of larch 22, 1921(55) - "It is .y duty to endeavour to hold 
the balance fairly and to see that both sides (railway staff 
and the public interes~ get a 'square deal'" - were thrown 
back ,t hi. with nu.erous quotes of tevidence' of railwaymen~ 
discontent. 
The same old issues arose again and again. Jagger 
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on coal rates by which the railways had sacrificed 
12,000,000. During this period the rates on agricultural 
products were only reduced to the tune of £650,000.(56) 
Once again he waS seen to be in collusion with tha "big 
business" interests, frequently depicted as a repulsive, 
selfish and exp10itive "Hoggenheimer". The Railway Review 
asserted that, to Jagger~ the coal interests were the "public". 
Pearce of the Labour Party viciously attacked Jagger on 
larch 20 for carrying coal on a non-profit-paying basis.(57) 
Jagger's reply to this particular point contended that as 
coal made up 54 per cent of the total tonnage of goods 
carried on the railways it was essential te reduce coal 
rates.(58) Another unfortunate feature of Jagger's reputation 
of being in collusion with big business was brought out by 
!Orris Alexander in parliament when he stated that Jagger had 
retrenched grossly unfairly with a million and a half pounds' 
reduction in regard to employees and £49,000 in the super-
intendence.(59) This was in actual fact untrue, but the 
allegation served to harden attitudes against Jagger. The 
opinion that he was Merely making ends meet on the railways 
without regard to the misery he caused was gaining ground. 
He was repeatedly criticised for just wanting to balance 
his accounts - usually at the expense of his employees.(60) 
After Jagger had introduced his Budget speech on may 
9, the criticisms which followed in the Budget debate were 
much the same as those made throughout the country over the 
previous year. Yet, from his parliamentary COlleagues, 
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deal of respect and approval - they always considered him 
to be a man of great integrity. Hertzog, for example, 
considered him to be a very honest man, and one of the 
most courteous members of parliament.(6l) Havenga thought 
he had joined "evil company" which had corrupted his good 
John X. Marriman (South African Party, 
Stellenbosch) echoed this criticism a week later when he 
asserted that "evil communications had corrupted "r. Jagger's 
excellent manners n .(63) When appointed minister of Railways 
and Harbours, Jagger had been marked by many as the man 
"to set the railways right", but many now wondered if Jagger 
had not become too fanatical about economising. As far as 
they were concerned the only concessions he had made - other 
than to his cronies in the coal and cement trades - were 
the reductions made as from April 1 on fertilisers, grain 
products, fruit and dairy produce.(64) 
Jagger introduced the 1922-23 Budget on may 8 at 
which it was announced that the deficit instead of being the 
estimated t693,000 would be nearer tl,800,000. The accumulated 
deficit of w8ll over t4,000,000 "would be financed out of 
t2,000,000 from the Renewals Fund and from the temporary loan 
of tl,500,000 provided for in the Loan Estimates for 
1921_22".(65) Jagger also proudly announced that as a 
result of economies implemented, the expenditure for the 
past year would be about a million pounds less than the 
amount originally provided for. This was mainly as a result 
of reductions in supplies of railway equipment, modification 
of the eight-hour day, less engine miles run, decrease in 
(6ll Oebates, 21.3.22, p. 77, col. 1. 
(62 Ibid 9.5.22, p. 195, col. 1. 
(63 Ibid 16.5.22, p. 208, col. 3. 
(64) Cape Argus 28.3.22. 











starr owing to a falling off in traffic, and savings in 
subsidiary services as a consequence or reduced business. 
During the course of his address, Jagger said that "non-
essential work has been eli.inated and certain classes of 
work reorganised to secure greater efficiency and econo.y. 
Train services have been curtailed wherever possible and Many 
stations and sidings have been closed. Overtime and Sunday 
payments have been reduced and the general application of the 
eight-hour day was modified_ M(66) He then went on to 
announca that exhaustive investigations regarding railway 
extension. had been carried out and that a Bill on the matter 
would soon be introduced. The critici •• which followed was 
largely unconstructive, often tinged with prejudices of the 
time in order to gain a few debating points. C.W.lalan 
(Nat., Hu.ansdorp) for example, stated that the railway's 
financial problems stemmed from the use of the railways for 
the free transport of troops during the war (an assertion 
which was untrue, but guaranteed to drum up some Afrikaner 
lationalist support) and its use as an immigration bureau 
(also a sore point among Afrikaner lationalists). 
Dna of the more i.portant criticism. insofar as 
Jagger's policy as a whole was concerned, was .ade by the 
Labourite Snow, who condemned the retrenchment of men (of 
which there were 12,672 retrenched in 1921)(67), while there 
were plenty of repairs to be done to rolling stock. It was 
all very well pursuing economy and making the railways pay 
from a business view, but the railways "could not be run like 
a little Shop".(68) J.S~e.art called this sort of econo.ising 
(66j (67 
(68 
Debates, 9.5.22, p.192, col. 2. 
Ibid 25.5.22, p. 237, col. 2. 











"idiotic and suicidal M(69) while the point is corroborated 
by H.G.Ashworth who asserts that Jagger tried to run the 
railways as he ran his business, which was a •••• onal one 
and that he applied short-ter. remedies instead of taking 
a long-term view of the railways.(70) frankel, 1n his 
discussion of railway policy Mentions this point when he is 
talking of political considerations determining railway 
policy. "Vital expenditure which would have resulted in a 
reduction of operating costs or development of traffic has 
been curtailed or postponed. This is illustrated by the 
policy adopted in the development of railway workshops.n(7l) 
In his reply to the debate Jagger predictably refused to 
budge, especially aa his pride in his measures of economy 
had been dented as far as the railway workshops were concern-
ed - it was the only item on the 1921-1922 Railways and 
Harbours Vote which had been overspent, according to Jagger. 
Ashworth in fact goes so far as to say Jagger was disastrous 
for the South African Railways, for he not only estranged 
the bulk of the staff but came close to wrecking the 
railwayst rolling stock through parsimony. 
This attitude seem. to be corroborated by the Labourite 
Pearce who asked Jagger for more information on rumours which 
were circulating on the number of railway accidents recently 
reported on account of rolling stock in poor condition.(72) 
An incident during the 1925 parliamentary session however 
resulted in a devastating attack on Jaggerts policy of 
economy by Sir lilliam Hoy in his 1925 Report.(73) It had 
(69) Debates, 25.5.22, p. 218. 
(70) H.G.Ashworth, Esq. - Oral evidenc •• 
(71) frankel, ~ cit. p. 11. 
(72) Debates, 21.6.23, p.415, col. 1. 












been asserted that expenditure on rolling stock maintenance 
was too high. Jagger asserted he had never been informed of 
this because the Administration's senior office. were 
unaware of this. Hoy replied that he had informed Jagger 
of this necessity, one particular occasion being a letter 
frOM a manufacturing company director stating that he was 
surprised at the efficiency of the railways considering the 
out of date material. Hoy went on to state that year after 
year funds for ne •• achinery had been requested and in-
variably refused. " ••••• there were .any occasions when 
the reasons advanced for the refusal were, in my opinion, 
altogether the reverse of sound, notable amongst which, 
was that advanced during 1921 to 1924 and which consisted 
of a bold statement to the effect that no money for work-
shops, etc., was available."(74) There was also very strong 
criticism of railway policy as a whole frOM the Johannesburg 
Chamber of Commerce.(75) All these criticisms were put 
most forcefully by Walter ladeley (Lab., Benoni) when he 
complained that "insane retrenchment galloping on, the ranks 
of the unemployed were swollen and the spending power of the 
people lessened and that, too, while the rolling stock of the 
country was in a deplorable state."(76) 
Jagger was very proud to be able to announce in 
August at a meeting of the Transvaal Agricultural Union that 
for the first time in four years the railway had just been 
able to pay their way, in April, I;ay and June. (77) By 1923, 
however, there were apparently welcome signs that the Union 
was beginning to recover from the depreSSion, notwithstanding 
(74) U.G.50 - 25, pp.13-l9. See also frankel, opcit. p.17. 
(75) Cape Argus, 3.6.22. 
(76) Debates, 11.7.22, p. 342, col. 3. 











the pessi.istic tone of ~aggerts speeches and of the 1923 
General .anager's Report. The latter stated that during 
1922-23 "there were few signs of a revival from the depress-
ing trade conditions which set in during 1920. The continued 
chaotic state of European affairs, the effects of the 
industrial upheaval ••••• early in 1922, the heavy loss 
sustained by the far.ing section of the population owing to 
the ravages of locusts and prevalence of drought ••••• 
combined to retard improvement in the economic and trade 
conditions in the Union."(78) The position on the railways, 
however, was still not very rosy. On february 14 Jagger 
announced in parliament that there had been a decline in 
revenue of six-and-a-half per cent, well over £1,000,000.(79) 
He had of course managed to economise very well and up to 
December saved 11.2 per cent on 1921, or £1,500,000. In the 
1923-1924 Estimates Jagger also managed to budget for a 
saving of £884,000.(80) In addition, for 1922-1923 there 
was a surplus of earnings over gross working expenditure of 
£4,600,000.(81) In fact in this year, even after interest 
on capital had been deducted, there was a surplus on the 
joint account of £817,080.(82) It was only contributions to 
the Pension and Betterment funds which made for a deficit of 
£31,000 for the year and an accumulated deficit of £2,220,511 
on larch 31, 1923. 
There flollowed the usual criticisms of fanaticism and 
"neglect of those who were suffering" from Jagger's policy. 
Both Burton and Jagger delivered their Budget speeches on 
larch 28. During the course of his speech, Burton mentioned 
!i~l 
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that during the parliaMentary recess, he, Jagger and Duncan 
had spent .uch time investigating the Union's public 
expenditure and had succeeded in reducing expenditure in 
Many ways. This was not sufficient, however, and they had 
fixed on new scales of pay which would represent fairer pay 
for the work done.(83) Jagger's announcement that there 
had been an iMproveMent of £36,000 over the estimated deficit 
was welcomed, especially after his pessimistic statement of 
february 14. The past years' workings had fluctuated a great 
deal, but the improved position seemed to have resulted froM 
a surplus of £145,000 over the Harbour estimate as the Rail-
ways still had a loss of over £200,000.(84) Jagger then 
went on to announce his own scheme of re-classification and 
re-grading of the railways service, a move which once again 
aroused a storm of protest, intensifying Jagger's unpopularity. 
for example, in late July, once Jagger had accepted re-grading 
proposals made by the Conciliation Board, the railwaymen's 
elected members of the South African Railways and Harbours 
Board of Reference protested strongly against the scheme.(85) 
There were various mas. protests as well - such as that of 
the railways salaried staff.(86) 
Other MeaSures of economy announced by Jagger included 
large-scale reduction in train mileage - in 1923-24 he hoped 
to reduce the 1922-23 mileages by 1,500,000(87) - and in the 
staff. The latter was generally done by not replacing men 
who left the Railways Administration. In addition the 
estimates of working expenditure for 1923-24 showed a decrease 
of £230,000 on the actual expenditure for 1922-23. Yet for 
(83) Debates, 29.3.23, p. 196, cols. 2 - 3. 
(84) Ibid p. 198. 
(85) cap; Times, 30.7.23. 
(86) Rand Daily lail, 9.6.23. 











Jagger "there was no doubt that the cost of working the 
railways was far too high" - as compared with 1913 it was 
up by no less than ninety per cent.(88) Jagger thus stoutly 
defended his plan of re-grading and re-classification as an 
essential measure of economy, but he promised that the 
maximum reduction would not exceed ten per cent and that the 
Administration would meet with the various representative 
bodies of the railwayst eMployees to discuss the scheme.(89) 
Few people, however, were prepared to trust Jagger with his 
reputation a8 the "high priest of economy ••• they knew that 
such a gentleman could play ducks and drake8 with any service 
he had charge Of".(89) The unfortunate thing was that from 
the start Jagger was in too much of a hurry to balance his 
accounts and he "had made the big mistake of using the ethics 
of st. George's street(90) for what should be the ethics of 
a great public department".(89) 
from a primarily mercenary aspect all of Jagger's 
work appeared to have been justified when the reSUlts of the 
railway operations for the first two months of the 1923-24 
fiscal year were announced. Even after all charges had been 
debited to the railway accounts there was a credit balance 
of over £140,000.(91) On October 2 Duncan wrote that things 
were slowly improving in the Union - "revenue coming in 
fairly well and Railways making a substantial profit though 
.r. Jagger is doing all he can to hide it as it hinders his 
passion for economy fro. having its full scope".(92) By late 
October the railways earnings were showing an average of 
!i~l 
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£30,000 over the estimates - a very considerable improvement 
over the earnings of the previous six years which had all 
shown a 10s8.(93) This i~proved position continued and by 
Oece.ber 1 the accumulated deficit of larch 31, 1923 of 
£2,220,000 had been decreased by £900,000.(94) The position 
improved instantly and by the time Jagger introduced his 
Budget for 1924-5 C.I •• alan was able to say "Ek kan hom 
(Jagger) die versekering gee dat die land dankbaar is dat 
hy die finansies van die Spoorweg Oepartement so mooi 
reggemaak het".(95) Each month of the p •• t financial year 
had shown a surplus, the revenue showing an increase over the 
estimate of approximately £1,600,000, while the actual 
expenditure was expected to be £300,959 less than the amount 
originallyestimated.(96) The actual surplus of earnings 
over expenditure amounted to £5,613,000 while the net profit 
after Interest on capital had been paid amounted to 
£1,724,000.(97) The accumulated deficit for the year after 
a final profit of £1,450,206 for 1923-24, was reduced to 
£770,243.(91) 
Jagger had thus achieved marvsls with the financss, 
but this aenieve •• nt resulted in lasting unpopularity 
amongst the railwaymen. Things being what they wera in the 
Union at this time Jagger's policy was, rightly, considerad 
an asset by the newly formed lationalist-Labour Pact. 
for exampls, said in parliament that "we on the labour 
benches regard him [Jagger) as a great asset and we know 
perfectly w.ll that during the coming election the railwaymen 
will show the Hon. the Minister what they think of him and 
eale Times, 9.11.23. 
Ib d· 11.2.24. 
Debates, 27.2.24, p. 493. 
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the manner in which he has carried out the promises he 
gave them in regard to their being given a square deal".(99) 
On April 7 Smuts had announced that Parliament would 
be dissolving and a general election held. In .arch 1921 
when Jagger was taken into the Cabinet the South African 
Party had 79 seats, the National Party 45, Labour 9, 
Independents 1. Since then Smuts' majority of 24 had been 
whittled down to 8, with the South African Party holding 71 
seats, tha Nationalists 48, labourites 13, Independents 1, 
and one Constitutional Democrat.(lOO) In larch 1921 the 
South African Party lost Rusten~g' to the .ationalists and 
on 14 April 1921 East London went to the labour Party, both 
108sas on account of electoral technicalities. On September 
9, 1921, the South African Party lost both the Liesbeeck and 
the Gardens seats to the labour Party. Colonel Creswell 
gained the Stamford Hill sa at for the Labour Party, which 
the Cape Times called "a serious blow and a severe warning" 
for the South African Party.(lOl) Then in larch, 1923 
the National Party gained the Oudtshoorn seat from the 
government. On June 6, 1923, lajor Hunt (South African Party, 
Turffontein) resigned over the issue of re-grading the rail-
ways staff. This prompted the apt remark from the Cape Times 
that ·Iinisters cannot and shoul.(not be expected to yield 
to every representation made to them by members of parliament 
on their own side of the House. Ir. Jagger of all ministers, 
is least likely to be impressionable in this way."(102) 
"jor Hunt eventually resigned his seat and regained it as an 
Independent, increasing his 1921 majority by almost 500. 
199
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In early November 1923 very vigorous provincial election 
campaigns were held. In the Transvaal the National-labour 
majority was reduced from fifteen to ten(103) while in the 
Cape the Pact obtained a majority of one. During this 
time the South African Party held their own, but with reduced 
majorities in each case, in the constituences of Uitenhage 
(June, 1923), Parktown (September, 1924) and Umvoti (.arch, 
1924). Then on April 5, 1924, the famous South African 
Party defeat at Wakkerstroom was announced. The importance 
of the railway vote in this defeat was openly acknowledged 
by the press before Smuts ,..,.';;unced dissolution. The Cape 
Times, for example, cOllllented on the discontent amongst the 
Volksrust railwaymen.(104) At the same time Trade Union 
leaders were interviewed on the political developments, many 
of them being prone to cite Jagger's retrenchment policy 
on the railways as a dominant factor in the wave of 
antipathy against the government. Jagger's policy was 
rapidly utilised as a political tool by the Pact,(105) and 
consequently played no mean r6le in the defeat of Smuts' 
government. Jagger had balanced his accounts and Neame'. 
assessment of this, though exaggerated, contains a great 
deal of truth. " ••••• Jagger'. axe retrenched. Ha scrapped. 
He cancelled ordars. He tore estimates to shreds. He 
lengthened working hours. In finance he was Charles lartel 
and Tamerlane and Attila rolled into one. Deputations fled 
without putting their case. Officialdom trembled outside his 
door. Thirty thousand White railway employees gnashed their 
teeth in helpless rage. The accounts were balanced. It was 
magnificent, but it was not politic8~ Jagger saved tha 
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VILIfICATION fOR JAGGER : TABLE BAY HARBOUR 
1921 - 1924 
In his overweening desire to economise and to 
"put the railways in order" Jagger very frequently over-
looked the consequences of his actions. This was generally 
the case with most of his economising measures. One 
particular issue which roused the ire of many South Africans 
was the question of the extension and development of the 
Union's ports. The Durban harbour was in the process of 
being modernised when Jagger came into the Cabinet, and, 
in the midst of saving and retrenching, the Railway Admin-
istration continued to set aside fairly considerable sums of 
money for this purpose. for two years, however, from march, 
1921 until .arch-April, 1923, there was a consistent campaign 
for the extension and development of the Table Bay Harbour, 
since little development had taken place since 1910. This 
at first sight appeared to be a fairly parochial issue, but 
both the press and the commercial circles of the interior 
supported the leading campaigners - the Cape Times and the 
Cape Town Chamber of Commerce - over this issue. 
In addition it was pointed out time and again that the 
development of the Cape Town harbour was of national and not 
merely local importance. This contention had a great deal of 
truth in it, especially if one considers, for example, that 
in 1921 of the 348,572 tons of coal shipped from Cape Town 
254,608 tons came from the Transvaal(l) while 105,454 tons 
came from Natal.(2) 
Even before Jagger's appointment to the Cabinet was 
(1) Cape Times, 14.8.22. 











announced, "long-established concern in commercial circles 
over the stagnation of Cape Town's dock development" was 
voiced,(3) and appeals for extension came from as far afield 
as the free State Chamber of Commerce.(4) Throughout march 
1921 indignant editorials appeared in the Cape Town press on 
the question of the development of the docks. When Parliament 
assembled, Jagger was assailed by a barrage of questions 
requesting information on his intentions regarding the 
development of the docks and by demands for immediate 
extensions. .ajor van Zyl (S.A.P., Cape Town, Harbour), for 
example, stated that the matter of dock extension was one of 
urgent necessity, particularly as the docks, he maintained, 
were in a worse condition than they had been t.enty years 
previously. He went on to say that any further delays might 
jeopardise the future of Cape Town as a port.(5) 
All this publicity and the various pressures in 
parliament had their effect on Jagger, for on may 31 the 
appointment of a special committe. to investigate the develop-
ment of the docks in Cape Town was announced. This was a 
welcome concession, but it met only qualified approval from 
the press - " ••••• if it means that the question of carrying 
immediate improvements to repair the perilous shortcomings 
of the present accommodation and facilities at the docks, 
which are throttling trade right and left, is to be still 
further postponed to await a leisurely verdict on the larger 
question of railway policy, then the news will come as an 
unpleasant shock to public opinion".(6) The Rand Daily mail 
then spoke of "administrative myopia and neglect" and of 
"delays possibly jeopardising the future of the port".(?) 
Cape Times, 1.3.21. 
~ 2.3.21. 
Debates, 10.5.21, p.143. 
Cape 11m.s, 31.5.21. 











The announcement of the appointment of the committee 
led to a full-scale debate on the future of the docks on 
June 1 in the House of Assembly. Jagger resolutely refused 
all requests, including forceful attacks from van Zyl, 
Mushet (S.A.P., Liesbeeck) - who also pleaded for the use of 
the unemployed in this work - .adeley and R.W.Close. Jagger, 
as always, based his decision on the lack of finance available, 
though he acknowledged the necessity for development.(S) 
The Cape Times referred to this as a "melancholy debate" in 
which ".r. Jagger, who in the dual role of departmental 
apologist and vigilante member for Cape Town Central enjoyed 
considerably less than his usual degree of success" in a 
speech of "autumnal sorrow".(9) 
In October 1921 the Committee submitted its report 
and, unfortunately for Jaggerts programme of economy, after 
acknowledging the need for extensive improvements to the 
harbour, it recommended the urgent implementation of immediate 
development. It stated that the most pressing needs were 
improved facilities at the existing docks and then the 
proviSion of additional deep-water berths.(lO) It also 
recommended that the breakwater extension was of primary 
importance and should be commenced without delay. It suggested 
a yearly vote of £536,000 by Parliament for six years and 
£65,000 a year for the following four years of the scheme 
of extensions. By this time (late 1921) the campaign had 
almost fizzled out - particularly since the end of the 1921 
parliamentary session and, except for the periodic editorial 
urging the government to action, it remained in abeyance 
for the rest of 1921. 
(S) Debates, 2.6.21, p. 209 












On the day of the opening of parliament in 1922 the 
Cape Times once again made a passionate appeal for the 
immediate extension of the harbour and would probably have 
sustained this campaign for the rest of the session had the 
Rand Strike of 1922 not pushed the issue of harbour extensions 
well into the background. Towards the end of the session the 
issue was again raised, and the campaign gathered momentum 
and reached its climax during the second half of 1922. major 
van Zyl reiterated his criticisms(ll) 8S did Close and 
Greenacre (S.A.P., Durban Point).(12) Soon the press was 
once again up in arms about the "paltry sum" of £20,000 which 
Jagger set aside for improvements. The Cape Times for 
example, referred to "a beggarly £20,000" for "preliminary 
tinkering" with the South Arm.(13) Both the Cape Times and 
the Rand Daily mail criticised what they considered to be a 
wast. of money in the allocation of £310,000 "to sink into 
the sands of Walvis Bay".(14) 
Once parliament rose the campaign was taken up in 
earnest by the President of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, 
mr. E. Row.. He took up the clarion call of the Cape Times 
and went on to assert that there was nothing local or 
parochial in this campaign for harbour development. He state~ 
at a protest meeting on this issue that "It is a national 
claim beCause Cape Town is the gateway not only to South 
Africa but to the Southern Hemisphere H .(15) At the same 
meeting J.W."ushet maintained that the harbour was "at least 
twenty-five years behind the times". The recommendations of 
the committee which Jagger had appointed ware also takan up 
(11) Debates, 7.7.22, p. 334. 
(12) Ibid 8.7.22, p. 336. 
~i;~ Cape Times, 12.7.22 and Rand Dai1l mail, 11.7.22. Ibid ~ 











and the call went out again and again for the iMplementation 
of its proposals of immediate and urgent action. 
On July 20 Jagger met a deputation from the Chamber of 
Co.merce, consisting of members of its Banagement and 
Harbour and Shipping Committees. The latter put forward a 
strong case for the development of the harbour and intimated 
that it was "usaless talking of a lack of money" - particular-
ly as the government was spending £300,00cr on Walvis Bay. In 
reply Jagger actually stated his sympathy with the views of 
the Chamber, but pointed out that the financial situation 
had to be reckoned with.(16) The Rand Daily mail went on 
to attack Jagger for his "studied refusal tomsry out the 
advice of a special committee of technical and business 
experts •••• that the commencement of a harbour improvement 
scheme necessitating an annual expenditure of over half a 
million for a number of years should be treated as a matter of 
"urgency", also that this starvation of development should 
be inflicted on the port during the regime of a -business' 
Railway Minister".(17) 
Another major field of criticism of the state of the 
docks at the time came from the fruit-growing interests. 
The provision of enlarged and improved cold storage facilities 
alongside a deep-water berth was requested by the Fruit 
Growers' Exchange - yet Jagger, once again, remained un-
convinced of the necessity for spending money on increased 
cold storage facilities at the docks. In this he was again 
ignoring the recommendations of the Committee which he had 
appointed. The Cape Times commented that Jagger's policy 
was "so unbusinesslike that it was surprising to find a 
'b ' • m' it' 't" (18) us~ness ~n s er sponsorlng ~ • 
(16) Rand Daily Mail, 28.7.22. 
(17) l£!£. 











In the second week of August the Cape Town Chamber of 
Commerce convened a conference "representative of the 
political, agricultural, commercial and industrial life to 
deliberate on the steps necessary to bring the plight of the 
docks to the notice of the government". On the eve of this 
meeting the Cape Times commented: 
"The Prime minister and his colleagues will recognise, 
we beliava, that Mr. Jagger is a very scrupulous man, 
who, in his anxiety to show no undue favours to his 
own city, has actually been less fair to her undeniable 
claims ••• the datermination of patriotic citizens of 
Cape Town to force it [this claim] upon the attention 
of the government involves no diminution of their respect 
for Mr. Jagger himself. Very much to the contrary, 
Cape Town is proud of his ability and integrity ••• 
To him, money spent in Cape Town is money spent for 
the sole benefit of Cape Town and, as the Cape Town 
Docks are not self-supporting from the business point 
of view, his honest soul revolts against sinking more 
, 
capital in what he sees as an unremunerative enterprise ••• 
But Cape Town Docks he cannot see as one of the essential 
traffic valves of the great and flowing engine of South 
African trade, business and industry ••• Such a view of 
the finance of Cape Town Docks is fantastic in its 
"(19) 
• • • • limitations 
It mayor may not have been true that Jagger was 
being scrupulous about spending money on his home city, but 
this was probably not his prime motivation. All through 
his term of office we see a Jagger loath to spend any money 
on extensions or improvements. It certainly was true that 
Jagger did take a rather narrow and short-sighted view of 
business, but it often enabled him to hit back at his critics 
rapidly and incisively in public debate. for example, the 
Cape Town Chamber of Commerce on August 14, 1922, sent Jagger 
(and the press) a long series of resolutions expressing grave 











concern that Parliament had voted no money towards the 
extension of the breakwater and that no adequate provision had 
been made to start work on the scheme, recommended by his 
committee, during the coming year. 
At the conference mentioned earlier, J.W.mushet 
brought a new element into the campaign for the development 
of the Docks. He mentioned that the Dominions Royal Commissi~~ 
appointed shortly before the first World War broke out to 
inquire into the question of the development of the Empire's 
resources, had emphasised the strategic importance of the 
Union's ports. In 1918 this commission had recommended the 
elevation of Cape Town and Durban into first-class harbours. 
This line of argument was utilised very effectively by the 
Chamber of Commerce in its campaign to win Jagger over. The 
Conference in fact appointed a standing committee to mobilise 
public opinion and generally campaign for the government's 
approval of harbour extensions. 
Jagger replied to the resolutions sent to him by the 
Chamber of Commerce on August 23, stating that money had been 
set aside for practically all the improvements which the 
Commission had found to be urgent, that is, a sum of £300,000. 
(for a comparison with expenditure of other years see 
Appendix Eight(I)). It was then said that "the minister did 
not consider that there was any pressing hurry" for the 
completion of the scheme recommended by the CommiSSion. In 
addition Jagger argued that it could not be implemented as 
there was no money for this type of development, and that it 
.i) was a definite policy of the Administration that the aggregate 
f' revenue of the harbours of the Union must meet the aggregate 
7 
expenditur~and not calIon the Railways to meet any 
deficiency~20) In his reply Jagger also disputed the 











assertion that Cape Town was the "gateway to South Africa" 
on the grounds that, when general merchandise was considered, 
far from being the "Gateway to Africa", Cape Town WaS further 
away from the producing and consuming districts of the 
interior than any other port. He provided a long list of 
statistics in an attempt to refute charges that the state 
of the docks had brought about a loss in revenue, arguing 
that in previous years Table Bay had easily handled heavier 
tonnage than it did in 1922.(21) (See Appendix Eight (II» 
Jaggerts reply was a strong one, stated quite unequivocally. 
It brought, however, indignant reproaches from both 
the press and the Chamber of Commerce. The Cape Times 
rebuked Jagger for his "unsound propositions" regarding the 
time factor as well as his fiscal policy for the harbour. 
It went on to say that "if we allow the merely cash_book 
method of reckoning out the accounts of the harbours to 
dominate our developmental policy we shall learn to rue the 
day".(22) The Chamber of Commerce Made the telling point 
that "the Minister cannot surely have overlooked that, with 
direct government control of harbours the profits earned, 
or the losses sustained, in the working of individual harbours 
may largely be determined by the general financial policy of 
the Government n .(23) This point was then taken up by the 
Cape Times which asserted that "the harbours of the Union 
are the ancillaries to the railways and •••• the argument 
which regards each individual harbour as an isolated unit 
in the transport system of South Africa is mischievous in its 
tendency because it encourages the inland community to 
believe that when capital expenditure is incurred on a 




















interests of that port and not in the general interests of 
the country •••• a very short-sighted line of reasoning n .(24) 
The Chamber of Commerce's reply also contained the 
argument that the figure of £300,000 to be spent on the 
harbour quoted by Jagger was entirely misleading as the 
actual amount to be spent on extension was only £50,000. 
After further detailed criticisms the Chamber's memorandum 
went on to say that the whole question resolved itself into 
"whether the Administration believes in the future of the 
country, believes in the great industrial and agricultural 
expansion which the next decade is expected to bring, and 
whether it realises that the only sound policy is to set our 
house in order and be ready for •••• a great and general 
revival of trade in all directions. This is a bigger question 
than the immediate balancing of revenue and expenditure."(25) 
This was obviously not what Jagger thought. Throughout 
his term of office, he considered the balancing of revenue 
and expenditure to be his task. He could not see beyond this 
immediate task and as a result his policy remained a short-
sighted, amputated one. The next stage in the campaign for 
harbour development came with the announcement that Sir 
George Buchanan, an eminent engineer, would investigate the 
problem of Table Bay Harbour development.(26) In the mean-
time the debate continued between Jagger and the Chamber of 
Commerce with both the Cape Times and the Rand Daily mail 
regularly adding fuel to the controversy. In September 
Jagger did make one important concession - after meeting a 
deputation from the powerful Fruit Growers' Exchange of South 
Africa on September 18. He announced that he was considering 
the provision of more suitable cold storage accommodation, 
(24) Cape Times, 1'.9.22 
(25) Ibid. 











since the Railways Administration realised "the absolute 
need for the development of deciduous exports n .(27) This did 
not, however, stave off the stream of editorials referring 
to "dissipation of effort n (28) and the "pursuit of non-
essentials n (29), and to these comments were added appeals for 
port development in Cape Town from such diverse bodies as the 
South African Commercial Exchange and the Agricultural Union 
Congress.(30) 
Then, in late October, the Cape Argus produced a lengthy 
article during the course of which it was pointed out that 
in 1910 the Cape had contributed the Cape Town Harbour profit 
of £429,000 to the Railways and Harbours Consolidated Revenue 
fund. Yet between 1910 and 1922 the government furnished 
only £392,841 on the equipment and improvement of the harbour-
a reasonable cause for complaint.(3l) 
On November 3, 1922, Jagger held a "report-back" 
meeting with his constituents. At this meeting he denied 
starving Cape Town Harbour of funds, and generally presented 
a rosy pict:ure of the future, avoiding contentious remarks. 
The possibility of railway extension was held out as a sop-
pending the forthcoming report of Sir George Buchanan which, 
he said, would probably be completed by the second week in 
November.(32) By early January, 1923, however, this report 
had not yet been released. The Cape Times said that at 
Buchanan's appointment many had felt that he would come out 
with a verdict favourable to the government as he had 
already decided that Table Bay had no case for development!~) 
The position had now, according to the Cape Times, changed 
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It also criticised Jagger very strongly for delaying tactics 
in not releasing or publishing the report. It even went so 
far as to question Jagger's integrity on this issue - a quite 
remarkable action at this time for a government-supporting 
newspaper.(34) 
On february ~ a deputation from the Chamber of Commerce 
visited Jagger and he appears finally to have capitulated. He 
told the deputation that funds for dock development in Table 
Bay Harbour were to be placed on the Loan Estimates for 1923-
1924. It was, however, only with the publication of Sir 
George Buchanan's report that Jagger's previous position was 
made entirely untenable. Buchanan quite explicitly maintained 
"the pressing necessity" for an immediate extension of the 
docks".(35) All protest subsided and in may, 1923, Jagger 
provided for £250,000 for the extension and improvement of 
the docks. 
In retrospect the issue is of very minor political 
significance, yet at the time reflected very badly on Jagger, 
who was, of course, already an extremely unpopular Minister. 
The Table Bay Docks were without doubt inadequate for handling 
an expanding trade; it possessed only one deep-water berth 
and its cold storage accommodation was very unsatisfactory. 
The port was of both national and international significance. 
In addition the Cape sea route had always been of immense 
strategic importance, and the growing importance at this 
time of the Panama and Suez rou~ merely increased the 
need for improvements to the harbour. All these factors 
working in conjunction with the fact that world shipping 
was at this time developing very rapidly and that inter-
national economic mobility was ever on the increase should 
(34) Cape Times, 4.1.23. 











have been apparent to Jagger. It was unfortunate that 
his bogey of economy should have clouded his judgement, 
added to his already considerable unpopularity and 











JAGGER'S THORNY PROBLEms A mISCEllANY 
One of the thorny problems confronting Jagger during 
his tenure of office was that of the railways of German South-
West Africa. In may 1922, Jagger introduced the South-West 
Africa Railways and Harbours Bill, the object of which was 
to incorporate the railways in South-West Africa completely 
and entirely in the railways of the Union, an extra mileage 
of 1331.(1) Ironically when one considers the position of 
South-West Africa today, the National Party very strongly 
opposed Jagger's Bill. The attack was led by Havenga who 
accused Jagger of wanting to confiscate the South-West 
Africa railways; he maintained that the mandate in respect 
of South Africa did not entitle the Union Government to 
appropriate these railways as this would then be a violation 
of the Treaty of Versailles which had only allowed the Union 
Government to act as "guardian" of the territory. Hertzog 
then went on to state that the country feared that this was 
merely the first step towards total annexation of the 
Protectorate, which would add to the bitterness and hatred 
in the country.(2) Another objection which was frequently 
reiterated was that it was alleged the Union "would be 
saddled with the deficits on the South-West African Rail-
ways".(3) The Opposition's reaction was so antagonistic 
that Jagger referred the Bill to the Select Committee on 
Railways and Harbours almost immediately after the start of 
the second reading debate. There was also substantial 
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"bearing the burden" of the South-West African Railways 
deficit was particularly resented by the inland are._ which, 
according to the Rand Daily mail, mould bear the brunt of the 
cost.(4) Strong protests on the same grounds mere launched 
by various bodies, such as the Bloemfontein Chamber of 
Commerce.(5) 
When the amended Bill was returned to the House of 
Assembly at the end of -'ay, Havenga once again objected to 
what he called the principle of annexation or confiscation 
embodied in the Bill. Havenga then introduced another 
objection, one which was to dominate the rest of the debate. 
It was asserted that the Bill interfered with the private 
rights of the railways in the Protectorate, for one of the 
clauses of the Bill stated, inter alia, that "no private 
railways shall be constructed within the territory and no 
private railways whether constructed before or after the 
commencement of the Act, shall be worked within the 
territory.n(6) The opposition then proudly set itself up 
as the protectors of private railways in South-West Africa, 
and at the same time attack~d: Jagger for his autocratic 
obstinacy and his attitude of looking at everything in terms 
of commodities, while overlooking the hUman factor at all 
times. This was, in this particular instance, grossly unfair 
to Jagger, but he had to face this type of criticism through-
out the period he was minister of Railways and Harbours. 
The unfortunate aspect about it all was that Jagger never did 
learn to be less forthright and outspoken, less obstinate 
and less one-sided in his determination to get things done -
(4) Rand Daily mail, 11.5.22. 
(5) Cape Times, 12.5.22. 












irrespective of other priorities. He always remained more 
honest and above-board than politic or politically sagacious. 7 
Another "mini-crisis" which faced Jagger in parliament 
was that which followed his introduction of a Railways 
Construction Bill in June 1922. The first objections came 
of course from those members of parliament whose own particular 
areas were not included in the new Bill. Generally the Bill 
was greeted with approval, especially as it came from Jagger, 
the one man in the cabinet who had been breathing fire and 
brimstone for well over a year, as far as economising was 
concerned. The Bill itself provided for 847 miles of new 
railway at a cost of approximately £4,000.000.(8) Jagger 
had said dudng the previous year that railway extensions 
should be the railwayst first priority, but in 1921 this had 
not bean provided for because of the financial situation. 
(See Chapter I.) Now, although welcoming the extensions, 
the opposition criticised Jagger for changing his policy in 
1922. It did, admittedly, appear illogical since as far as 
the government was concerned there had as yet been no 
appreciable improvement in the railway finances. The decision 
was presumably politically expedient at the time - which would 
lead one to assume that the obstinate, principled, uncomprom-
ising Jagger would not have agreed to the decision. His 
performance during the debates on the Bill was luke-warm, but 
that is perhaps reading too much into the affair. The most 
difficult criticisms to face for Jagger, came in the Committee 
stage of the Construction Bill. J.p.mostert (Nat.,Namaqua-
land) told parliament that Jagger had told the railway 
authorities to refuse Mostert's request to inspect the 
various traffic officers t reports on the lines of railway 
J.W.Mushet in Immelman files. 











which were to be built. These reports ostensibly stated why 
certain lines were thought to be more important than others. 
The whole debate took on a rather unpleasant character with 
accusations of party political swindling in the air. It is 
unlikely that Jagger was implicated in this, yet the con-
clusion drawn by a stranger to the scene would have been that 
he ~ implicated. Jagger probably refused access for the 
very reason which he gave in parliament - because he felt they 
were purely departMental reports for the information of the 
Railways Administration. He disregarded the consequences of 
his actions as he did not care at all if scandalous t~gs 
were said about him. The incident was in itself of a very 
minor nature - its im~ortance lying in the adverse publicity 
it gave to Jagger and its providing yet another example of a 
Jagger riding roughshod over all opposition, a characteristic 
which he shared with his Prime minister, and one which, 
regrettably, seems to have become endemic in South African 
politics. 
Jagger also had a somewhat torrid time with the 
introduction of the Railways and Harbours Service Amendment 
and further Provision Bill on march 26, 1923. moving the 
second reading Jagger proposed to refer the Bill to the 
Select Committee on Railways and Harbours. The Bill itself 
was not of great political Significance - it provided for, 
inter alia, conditions of permanent employment and ways of 
daaling with inefficiency, misconduct and criminal 
prosecution.(9) It also tended to increase the power of the 
Minister of Railways and Harbours somewhat arbitrarily. One 
of the aspects of the Bill which was most strongly criticised 
was that which provided for railwaymen to appeal to a board 











when charged with misconduct, but without allowing him 
adequate legal representation. As G.B. van Zyl pointed out 
in parliament, this then was not even an appeal.(lO) Another 
aspect which caused some trouble was that, from some of the 
clauses, it seemed as though it might be possible for the 
.inister of Railways and Harbours to prevent certain 
organisations appearing before the Select Committee on 
Railways and Harbours. 
It was of course feared at this time of the Jagger-
N.U.R.A.H.S. feud that the Bill, if it became law, would be 
used against the N.U.R.A.H.S. by Jagger. The first protest 
meeting on the Bill was held on february 11. The General 
Secretary of the N.U.R.A.H.S. addressing the second protest 
meeting on march 11 said that the main tendency of the Bill 
was "to benefit vested interests and there is too much 
legislation by regulation. We are being placed in the hands 
of those who make the regUlations ••••• "(11) The furore 
about the Bill arose shortly after Jagger's attack on ~oore 
in the House of Assembly and consequently the resentment 
aroused by the arbitrary nature of the new Bill was far 
greater. Another large protest meeting which was held at this 
time was addressed by morris Alexander and messrs. Snow, 
madeley and Sampson of the Labour party,(12) all of whom 
warned the railway.en to guard the few rights and privileges 
which they had left. This was an exaggerated view of the 
Bill, which embodied some good principles but was marred. 
great deal by its autocratic nature. Another indication of 
how unpopular the measure was, is provided by the almost 
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criticised both Jagger and Burton for manting to regrade 
the "lomer ranks" of the public servic •• (13) There was 
also a very strongly worded protest from the Executive 
Committ •• of the Railways and Harbours Salaried Staff 
Association.(14) 
The Bill was hailed as a "measure of great importance", 
a "Railwaymen's charter" by the Cape Argus(15) but this term 
was sarcastically refuted by Snow in the House of Assembly 
who claimed that no one would look on it as a "Railwaymen's 
Charter" unless it were substantially amended. Unfortunately 
the unsavoury dictation of attitude which had saused so much 
resentment during the debates on the 1922 Railways Construction 
Bill onc. again manifested itself in Jagger. He refused to 
accede to Alexander's request for a Sub-Committee report to 
be placed on the Table of the House. (This report had led to 
the introduction of the Bill.) Alexander angrily retorted 
that it appeared to be a "new doctrine for a Minister to 
treat Parliament as he pleased and as if the members were 
schoolchildren and were being deprived of something by a 
teacher".(16) It was an apt analogy as that was how Jagger 
looked upon encumbrances. Pearce's comments in another 
context seem to indicate the climate of opinion at this stage 
as far as their "burden", Jagger, was concerned - "The methods 
of the Minister were wrong and a danger to the State • • • • 
Humanity ••••• was dependent on its environment, and the 
.inister's environment had been that of pounds, shillings and 
pence, and to carryon things on business lines."(17) The 
Bill was eventually dropped in June, 1923, and reintroduced 
(13) The Caee, Vol. 16, No. 402, 6.4.23, p.3. 
(14) Rand Oail~ Mail, 7.4.23. 
(15 ) Caee Argus, 2.3.23. 
(16) Debates z 27.3.23, p. 188, col. 3. 























in an amended form during the 1924 session. Here it appeared 
that there was a fseling on the part of the railwayrnen in 
general that some of their rights were being taken away, 
particularly as regarded the rights of the pre-Union railway 
servants. People felt that the Railways Administration's 
tendency to govern by regUlation was being increased. 
Parlia •• nt was however prorogued before the Bill could become 
law. 
Jagger would set his sights on something, and though 
prepared to listen to others, would never change his mind. 
Though couched in polemical rhetoric these comments from the 
Railway Review have a lot of truth in them concerning Jagger's 
attitude. "It is of course inevitable that such a business 
personality ••••• should carry out these 'big business' 
principles into the management of a big national concern. 
He has lived and flourished in an atmosphere of bargaining 
and 'profit' and might be expected to be incapable of taking 
any broader national view of the circumstances, and the 
obligations of a people's railway ••••• "(18) 
On July 22, 1922, General Smuts' offer to Rhodesia of 
very broad and extremely generous terms for its incorporation 
into the Union were published for the first time. Since 1919 
there had been a long series of negotiation'between the 
British Government and the Chartered Company as to Rhodesia's 
future. Smuts was very keen to incorporate Rhodesia in the 
Union and had presumably had this possibility in mind for 
some time. Negotiations were held with Smuts in October 1921 
on the terms. After their publication in July a referendum' 
on the question of incorporation was announced but, despite 
Smuts' efforts, the Responsible Government Party, opposed to 




















to explain what the railwaymen faced, from the Administration's 
point of view.(23) But Hoy "the very able, but sometimes 
overmasterful General Manager ••••• was not very tactful in 
his interviews with the leaders of the men on the Rhodesian 
railway ••••• "(24) further evidence of the importance of 
Jagger's policy in connection with this question is provided 
by the .ass protest meeting, already referred to in this 
chapter, against the Railways Services Amendment Act on 
March 12, 1923. At this meeting a prominent member of the 
Rhodesian Union of Railwaymen, Kellar, described how they, up 
~orth, looked "down South" and when they saw what was going 
on, they decided against joining the Union.(25) Kellar went 
on to recount a personal brush with Jagger at an interview 
and spoke of "Jagger and Company and their press" being 
afraid of large organisations - his remarks on the importance 
of the railw,y question as regards Rhodesias's entry are 
thus quite probably exaggerated. Jagger's policy ~, however, 
a factor in the success of the Responsible Government Party 
and as a result added to his unpopularity in some circles 
and increased the tendency within the South African Party 
to think of Jagger as a liability. 
Jagger had been a very staunch free Trader all his 
life. "He honestly believed in keeping customs-duties 
down - this suited his business".(26) His guiding maxim in 
business was to buy cheaply overseas and to sell dear. 
Speaking of Jagger, Mr. J.M.Stephens said they all knew 
Mr. Jagger to be an out-and-out free trader. He thought Mr. 
Jagger must have been born that way. He was about the only 
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furrow, and standing alone, an object of much admiration to 
his fellow members on account of his courage, representing 
"(27) as he did an almost extinct race. Ashworth, however, 
maintains that being a realist Jagger was not above taking 
advantage of protection and relates how Jagger started first 
a footwear then a clothing factory when protection duties 
were first introduced.(28) "He {Jagger) is a fierce Free 
Trader raging in a chamber of calm and smug but unshakeably 
convinced Protectionists. He raspS out the austere principles 
of Gladstonian finance to easy-going men who like the State 
to spend with a liberal hand."(29) Jagger's very strong 
attachment to the principles of Free Trade is something for 
which most remembered him. It also provided the official 
reason for his resignation from the Cabinet on may 23, 1924. 
most parliamentarians knew or would have deduced that from 
1921. onwards the cabinet would have been divided on the 
question of protection and free trade. Jagger was in fact 
often criticised in parliament by the Rational Party and the 
Labourites for buying overseas because it was cheaper there. 
One of these critics (Stewart of the labour Party) 
asserted that while at that time 38 per cent of the railways' 
rolling stock was bought in South Africa, if Jagger introduced 
protective duties 75 per cent of its rolling stock could be 
produced in South Africa. This Jagger very firmly denied on 
many occasions, asserting time and again that since he had 
~ecome ~inister of Railways and Harbours not a single order 
had been placed overseas. This was however the result of 
economy rather than a desire to nurture South African industry. 
In the Budget of 1923 allusions were made by Burton to the 
protection of industries in South Africa which caused some 
(27) 
(28) 
J.W.Jagger: "Taxation", Economic Society of South 
Africa. Proceedings of Conference, 
July, 1925, p.15l. 












comments during the session regarding dissension in the 
Cabinet, but nothing much was said publicly. Jagger however 
wrote to Smuts stating that he felt the time had come when 
he should reconsider his position as a member of the Govern-
mente He stated that a policy of industrial development was 
"unsound and unjust" for the result is to "increase the cost 
of living, or handicap other industries more natural to the 
country".(30) His other objections included the fact that 
the number of protected industries was rising and that 
protection heightened the cost of living and thus handicapped 
the white man in his competition with the coloured. Smuts 
presumably reassured Jagger for he remained on as Minister 
of Railways for another fourteen months. 
Very little was said publicly on the question of free 
trade and protection for the next year. On March 26, 1924, 
however, Jagger announced in parliament that the government 
had been considering manufacturing its own railway materials 
but was now continuing its old policy. In late April however, 
when Smuts issued his election manifesto, he promised the 
country a huge railway factory. Then on May 13 Smuts wrote 
to Jagger stating that he had heard from Sir Alfred Hennessy 
that if the South African Party were to win the elections 
Jagger would not rejoin the Cabinet. After expressing his 
regret Smuts said that it would be wiser to face the situation 
now rather than to wait for a future crisis. He went on to 
say: "There is further feeling in my mind that your 
courageous administration of the Railways has put up the 
backs of many railwaymen who threaten to vote against our 
candidates as long as they think you will continue to rUn 
the Railways in future. I do not think much of this point. 












But there it is. And if in any case you make up your mind 
to go, it might serve the cause of our party in some small 
way in some few constituencies if you were tactfully to 
announce your intention before the date of the elections, 
and to base your action purely on the industrial point ••• n(3l) 
On .ay 19, Jagger sent his resignation to Smuts in the 
course of which he stated that upon seeing the stress laid 
by Smuts on an industrial policy in his Pretoria manifesto he 
felt compelled to resign from the Government.(32) Smuts 
accepted the resignation in gracious terms in a letter dated 
May 22 and thanked Jagger for his courageous work in administ-
ering the Railway Oepartment.(33) Whether or not this was 
Smuts' true opinion is more difficult to judge. He was 
obviously grateful to Jagger for his work on the railways 
finances but probably feared the consequences of his pruning. 
Sir Edgar Walton certainly thought of Jagger as a liability -
though possibl, a grudge held from Jagger's violent criticism 
of Walton in the Cape Parliament. Walton wrote to Smuts in 
1925 stating that "C.ill.Malan was ready to take a wider view 
of his railway responsibilities than was our friend Jagger, 
who has, in a marked degree, I think, the defects of his 
very extraordinary qualities as a 'koopman,n.(34) It was 
suggested at the time by Ons Vaderland that Jagger's resig-
nation was a "put-up job" and that if the South African Party 
were returned to power Jagger would resume his post as 
~inister of Railways and Harbours.(35) To a certain extent 
Sir Alfred Hennessy corroborates this view for he maintains 
that Smuts asked Jagger to reSign for the specific purpose 
of gaining some of the alienated railwaymen's votes.(36) 
(31) Smuts Papers, Vol. 30, No.l06,Smuts to Jagger,13.5.24. 
(32) Cape Times, 23.5.24. 
(33) Ibid 
(34) smuts Papers, Vol. 34, No.339,Walton to Smuts, 7.1.25. 























This of course is not in accordance with the facts as far as 
Jagger's resignation was concerned. However it probably is 
partially true as regards the timing of his resignation. 
Jagger remained as stubborn, arrogant, brusque, 
forthright and as short-sighted as ever. The whole question 
of his attitude to protection thus assumed great political 
significance in the 1924 election campaigns. Thus we see 
the Pact attacking the government for failing to deal with 
unemployment and arguing that if South African industries 
were subsidised thousands would be given jobS.(37) On June 
10 for example, mal an made a passionate attack on "Jagger 
and his colleagues" for being the lackeys of overseas 
factories.(38) Jagger's tenure as minister of Railways and 
Harbours was thus filled with both small and large problems, 
most assuming at one stage or another the proportions of a 
crisis. In themselves the take-over of the South-West 
African railways, the construction of a few branch lines and 
the revision of the conditions of employment of railwaymen 
are of infinitesimal significance. It seems in fact even 
ludicrous to discuss them in an historical context. However, 
the passio s which Jagger aroused by his actions are in 
different ways exemplified in each of these problems. 
Through his industry, his obsession for economy, his exact-
ing standards and his autocratic actions, Jagger made himself, 
his Administration and his Party extremely unpopular. 
(37) J. Hughes: "Factors 'Promoting a Victory for the Pact 
in the 1924 Election", (a.A.(Hons) 
Research Essay, University of Cape 
Town, 1966), p. 17. 











A SCANDAL FOR JAGGER 
In early 1924 Jagger faced yet another crisis. A 
scandal over the construction of a grain elevator at the 
Durban Harbour had been building up ever since the 1923 
parliamentary session. Now in early 1924 it broke and, 
though not directly involved, Jagger had to bear much of 
the blame. 
On February 14, 1923, J. Stewart of the Labour Party 
asked Jagger for information on the "trouble" with the grain 
elevator at Durban.(l) When he replied to the debate Jagger 
admitted that the Railways Administration had had considerable 
trouble with the construction of the Durban grain elevator, 
particularly with the foundations. He did not, however, give 
parliament any other information except to say that consult-
at ions had been held with the Railways and Harbours Board, 
the General .anager and the construction engineer, and that 
"they had decided now on a course of action which he hoped 
would be successful, although he did not say it would be".(2) 
Later on March 12, in moving the second reading of the 
Railways and Harbours Appropriation (Part) Bill, Jagger 
referred to a promise given on February 14 that he would make 
a statement in regard to the grain elevators. He then gave 
an abbreviated explanation of the series of disasters which 
had taken place at the Durban docks. 
The Union Government had, early in 1918, appointed a 
committee to enquire into an elevator system for the Union. 
This committee reported in July, 1918, recommending the 
erection of three port elevators and sixty-two country 
(1) Debates, 15.2.23, p. 78, col. 3. 
(2) Ibid 15.2.23, p. 79, col. 3. 











elevators, and also an investigation on the spot by a 
consulting engineer with special experience in elevator con-
struction.(3) The elevator scheme was adopted by the 
cabinet in August, 1918. In february, 1919, Mr. Littlejohn 
Philip was appointed as consulting engineer until february, 
1920 "for the purpose of advising the government generally 
on the matter of elevators ~ the best locality and their 
utility"(4), with a salary of £1000 a month and £250 a month 
expenses. Philip was reappointed in November, 1920 (almost 
entirely as a result of an interview with the General Manager 
on 16th October - where it was practically decided that he 
would be consulting engineer for the execution of the 
sCheme(5)) for three years. In December 1923 he was again 
reappointed, until such time as the Durban grain elevator 
was completed. All this time Philip's position as a director 
of Spencer and Company (construction engineers in the field 
of grain elevators) was well-known to the Railways Admin-
istration - a position from which he resigned in September 
1922. During his tenure of office of fifty-four months, 
he was in South Africa for only thirty-five months. 
The actual site of the Durban elevator at Congella was 
approved by all of the local officials as well as the Rail-
ways Administration - despite the fact that it lay on the 
line of the natural drainage of part of Berea. It was decided 
to construct the elevator on reinforced concrete piles, 
surmounted by cement slabs - again despite the fact that 
after the first three boreholes were sunk and completed in 
July and August, 1919, it was plain that there was a soft 
belt of clay which could not be expected to give sufficient 
(3) U.G. 26 - 24, p.2. 
(4) Debates, 13.3.23, p. 144, col. 2. 











support to pile foundations.(6) The main elevator was in 
two portions - the working house (containing the machinery) 
and the storage annexe.(7) The "considerable trouble with 
construction" mentioned earlier arose out of the fact that 
the levfto f the foundations slab carrying the working house 
was eleven feet lower than the level of the slab carrying 
the storage annexe. It would naturally be thought that the 
first piles to be driven down would be on the site of the 
working house. Yet the piles for it were only started on 
february 15, 1922 - a week after the annexa foundations were 
completed. This had disastrous results in that the slab 
foundation of the storage annexe cracked. Despite Jagger's 
lame attempts at justifying the Railways Administration -
"at least nine-tenths of the elevators in the world were 
built on a pile foundation"(8) - the great carelessness of 
the Administration's decisions could not be hidden. As 
the Commission of Enquiry later pointed out, the scheme was 
entirely unsuitable for the Durban site.(9) 
Then, in may, 1922, Jagger appointed a departmental 
committee to enquire into the best course of action to 
follow this initial error. A.W.menckins, the superstructure 
contractor, on July 12, proposed to sink ninety concrete 
cylinders to rock. Yet as Jagger said in parliament, "when 
the contractor began to proceed vigorously with the sinking 
of cylinders •••• it was found that the excavations of ground 
made for this purpose created cavities under the working 
house foundations, which caused an inrush of ground from the 
surrounding areas. The force of this inrush was so great 


















out of plumb "(10) • • • • 
The usually meticulous Jagger, who had an nattitude 
of honesty, a fairness [WhiChl showed in his business as in 
public life so that ••••• all agreed he could be trusted 
implicitly and was fa man straight and upright in all his 
dealingstn(ll), carefully refrained, at this stage, from 
mentioning in parliament that much of the trouble stemmed 
from the fact that the site chosen lay in the line of the 
natural drainage of Berea. This had made the soil clayey 
and totally unsuitable for the methods of construction re-
commended by Littlejohn Philip and adopted by the Railways 
Administration. Had Jagger's reticence been known, it is 
unlikely that Charles Pearce would have commented as he did 
later during the same debate - "the methods of the Minister 
were wrong and a danger to the State, although on his 
principles he considered the minister upright".(12) 
This seems to show evidence of yet another contra-
dictory quirk to Jagger. Most of his political opponents and 
even his most forceful critics acknowledged that they admired 
Jagger's integrity even if they distrusted his judgement. 
Hansard is littered with attacks on Jagger's railway policy, 
coupled with laudatory references to the nminister's upright 
fairness and integrity". Yet the minor episode in the grain 
elevator scandal related above does seem to suggest that 
Jagger was at least for the time being, trying to withhold 
all the evidence. Later on in the same debate both Colonel 
Creswell and major Hunt called on Jagger to appoint an 
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at this stage, there seems to have been surprisingly little 
real criticism of either Jagger's handling of this particular 
problem or of the whole elevator issue. 
In his reply to the Railway Budget debate on April 
26, 1923, Jagger again referred to the Durban elevator 
situation. He told parliament that on m:arch 29, he had 
appointed a "commission of three eminent engineers" - messrs. 
Ingham, Kanthack and Mackenzie - to inquire into the POSition 
at Durban.(13) He went on to say that it would not be in 
the "public interest" for him to say more than that at the 
present.(14) Once again Jagger managed to stave off COn-
troversy and, generally, all remained quiet regarding the 
elevator situation for the next two months, until parliament 
reached the committee stage on th  Railways and Harbours 
Estimates. Boydell and Havenga led the attack on Jagger for 
shortsightedness and mismanagement as far as the grain 
elevators were concerned. 
On June 20, 1923, Havenga asked Jagger for information 
as to whether it was true or not that £250,000 had been spent 
to no purpose whatever on the Durban elevator. Soon after-
wards, Boydell asserted, quite correctly, that the Ingham 
Commission had recommended that the foundation contract be 
cancelled and that the work be done departmentally.(15) 
Boydell went on to state quite specifically that there was 
something scandalous about the whole affair and asserted 
that there was a feeling in Natal "that something had been 
happening underground that should not" and that public 
opinion in Durban was up in arms.(16) He also referred to 
the "very nasty impression on the public mind of Durban" 
(13) U.G. 26 - 24, p. 71. 
(14) Debates, 27.3.23, p. 256, col. 1. 
(15) ~ 21.6.23, p.4l4, col. 3 and U.G.26-24, 
pp 71-72. 











by Littlejohn Philips' connection with Spencer and Company, 
the firm with the contract for the machinery. In his reply 
to the debate Jagger denied that any underground method had 
~.A 
( been employed and 'that the Administration had every hope of 
~ ~ 
the construction scheme succeeding - although the total cost 
of the elevators would now be £1,909,000 which was £450,000 
in excess of the estimates.(17) He hedged somewhat on the 
question of an inquiry or investigation and said that the 
General "anager considered that "further investigation into 
the subject he [Boydell) had referred to was not desirable 
at present".(18) 
There was little mention of the affair during the 
next few months and it was only early in January, 1924, when 
the Auditor-Generalis report was released, that it began to 
assume the proportions of a large-scale scandal. Editorials 
began to appear in the press speaking of a "scandal of the 
first magnitude"(l~), "high-handed secrecy and the withholding 
of information"(20), while the Auditor-General rather dramatic-
ally remarked that there was no indication of "an inquiry to 
determine the loss, and the facts are not getting any fresher; 
the actors are departing, accounts are being paid and the 
foundations are being covered with a solid apron of concrete 
three feet thick".(2l) The role of Mr. Littlejohn Philip 
in the whole affair was already at this stage subject to 
widespread suspicion. Yet, since Jagger refused to hold an 
inquiry or release some of the relevant papers, the Railway 
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on february, 1924 when Boydell, in an obviously well-
prepared speech, strongly appealed for the appointment of a 
select committee "to enquire into and report as to the 
responsibility for the excessive cost, and the circumstances 
in connection with the carrying out of the work of erecting 
the grain elevator at Durban".(22) Jagger refused this 
request despite openly admitting the need for an inquiry. 
His refusal was on the grounds that, since the issue referred 
to a highly technical matter, a select committee of parliament 
was a totally unsuitable body to enquire into the affair 
and to apportion any blame. There is much to be said for 
Jagger's point of view here and he argued his case very skil-
fully. He was on less steady ground when he objected to an 
immediate enquiry, since he felt that an enquiry would best 
be held once the work on the Durban grain elevator had been 
completed, since the contruction job was a very difficult one 
and required the constant attention of the engineers.(23) 
He proposed instead a committee of three to investigate the 
issue - two qualified engineers with a lawyer as chairman. 
Creswell seconded Boydellts motion and seemed to 
have taken umbrage as a result of Jagger's speech which, he 
asserted, disregarded the House of Assembly and its pre-
rogatives and ignored the principle of ministerial respons-
ibility.(24) He also said he was not prepared to trust a 
government-appointed commission for "the country is tired of 
the government and the way they appoint commissions, confined 
to their own political friends." C.W.Malan also maintained 
that Jagger had insulted the dignity of the House. "Die 




















hierdie kwart miljoen pond wat verkwis is. Oit word gevoel 
dat dit een van die ergste gevalle van verkwisting is wat 
daar vir tn lang tyd voorgekom het."(25) Boydell's motion 
was not carried, being negatived by 61 votes to 50. 
Considering the climate of opinion at the time, in 
particular the feelings of animosity towards Jagger by rail-
waymen generally, he was rather foolish in not acceding to 
the demands for an immediate enquiry - a mistake which it is 
perhaps not too far-fetched to say is in a small way analog-
ous to some of President Nixon's shortsightedness at the 
present moment. Both men appear to have considered their 
positions beyond enquiry. Jagger's usual obduracy did not, 
however, prevail. A day or two after the debate on Boydellts 
motion, the Cape Times published a letter from Littlejohn 
Philip during the course of which the latter described the 
Auditor-General's Report as "incomplete, inaccurate, mislead-
ing and unfair".(26) On the following day Jagger announced 
in parliament that there would no longer be any delay in an 
enquiry.(27) It was finally appointed on February 27. 
This commission's report was published on July 19, 
1924. Its assessment of the loss - "We find that the total 
amount expended upon the Durban foundations under Mr. Philip's 
scheme was £212,740, the whole of which was wasted" - caused 
a very great outcry. The commission also asserted that the 
whole of the loss on the foundations was attributable to 
Philip's recklessness.(28) He was severely castigated by 
the commissioners, in particular for his insufficient 
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driven, his failure to advise the Railways Administration 
to provide in the superstructural contract with mr. menckins 
that the contractor's operations should not begin until the 
foundations were satisfactorily completed, and his "culpable 
negligence •••• in concluding the Menckins cylinder contract 
with a contractor who was incompetent to undertake the 
work". (29) The commission also criticised Philip's stipul-
ation that he would only accept the post as consulting 
engineer on the condition that the right of his firm to 
tender for the supply of machinery should be conceded - a 
stipulation accepted by the Railways Board. "We think this 
provision was a departure from wholesome principles, both of 
business and morality.,,(30) On the whole, the commission 
found that "mr. Philip's control of the situation was 
vacillating, uncertain and indecisive". 
80th the Railways and Harbours Board and the General 
Manager were criticised for their shortsightedness in not 
taking cognisance of the unethical duality of Littlejohn 
Philip's position. The charges made by the General Manager 
and the Board against the departmental engineers on the 
scheme were firmly re~uted by the commission. "We do not 
for a moment suggest that the Board or the General manager are 
responsible for the engineering blunders, but they are 
mistaken in suggesting that the fault lies with the depart-
mental engineerso,,(3l) It was also stated that the General 
Manager threw over the departmental committee without consult-
ation and without enquiry into Mr. Philip's qualifications 
for carrying out the Durban foundations.(32) 
What of Jagger's role in the whole affair? As minister 
of Rail •• ys and Harbours he was not of course directly 
(29) U.G. 26 - 24, p. 78. 
(30) Ibid p.19. 
























responsible for all the blunders, but at the same time he 
had to bear the political consequences of the scandal. In 
some instances though Jagger did share responsibility for the 
mistakes. In the first place, he had been specifically 
warned by the South African High Commissioner in London, 
in a personal letter, dated December 22, 1921, of the 
stupidity of allowing Littlejohn Philip's firm to secure 
the contract for almost the whole of the supply of the 
material to the chief contractor.(33) There is no evidence 
that Jagger took any notice of this warning and he must 
therefore share the responsibility for the "unethical duality" 
of Philip's position. In addition, as was pointed out earlier, 
in parliament it appeared that Jagger was withholding inform-
at ion from the rest of the House of Assembly concerning the 
scandal. This was a very foolish mistake on his part. It is 
true that the original contracts were signed well before 
Jagger came into office, but the whole matter was, after this 
date, dealt with in such an unsatisfactory manner that it is 
quite obvious that Jagger failed to take charge of the 
situation "or to make any endeavour to stop the tremendous 
1 f h · h· "( 34) ass 0 money w 1C was g01ng on ••••• 
Above all, however, the scandal proved to be yet 
another crisis for Jagger. His entire period of office was 
filled with crises, most of which he was able to weather. 
The effects on the Smuts government were not so superficial. 
The finances of the country had only recently begun to 
improve while Jagger had of course done marvels through strict 
economising on the railways finances, but this was 
largely at the expense of the political support of the rank 
(33) U.G. 26 - 24, p. 45. 
(34) Railway Service Gazette, March, 1925, Vol. 1, 











and file of the railwaymen. Consequently many felt that the 
blunders made over the construction of the grain elevators 
were the direct result of harrassed officials under the orders 
of an autocratic, fanatically penny-pinching minister of 
Railways and Harbours. This aspect is clearly illustrated 
by a Cape Times report of the debate on Boydell's motion for an 
enquiry. During his reply Jagger explained that one of 
Philip's numerous decisions (to abandon the loading tests 
for the piles) had been made in the interests of economy. 
"Upon this remark there was a roar of ironic cheers and 
laughter from the opposition benches,,~35) - an appropriate 
reaction considering the economising Jagger had himself 
initiated. In retrospect, however, the whole scandal is of 
minimal significance to South African history. In this 
particular essay its importance lies mainly in the fact 
that it showed Jagger in a rather ambivalent light instead 
of the usual cut-and-dried, no-nonsen~picture we have 
of him. The scandal added to Jagger's unpopularity and 
provided another blow for the shaky Smuts government. 










CONCLUSION THE SKULL BENEATH THE SKIN 
Who was this man J.W.Jagger who caused so much 
animosity and bitterness in the early 1920's? John 
William Jagger was born in Northowram in Yorkshire on 
September 20, 1859. After receiving a primary school 
education at Burnsall Grammar School and some experience 
as an apprentice, he came to South Africa in 1880. He spent 
three years as a commercial traveller for the firm of Gordon, 
Mitchell and Company. On February 1, 1883, he established 
his own firm of J.W.Jagger and Company. The business expand-
ed very rapidly, with branches soon opening allover the 
country - Johannesburg (1888), Port Elizabeth (1894), 
Rhodesia (1893) and Durban (1915). In 1885 Jagger married 
mary Hall of Cape Town, who predeceased him by five years. 
They had two daughters. 
In 1887 he joined the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce 
and by 1892 was prominent enough to be the Chamber's 
delegate to the Second Congress of Chambers of Commerce in 
London. He was President of the Cape Town Chamber in 
l899-l90P,1906, 1909-1913, was first honorary secretary 
of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of South Africa, and 
was President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce from 
1899 to 1904. Jagger also helped to found the Cape Technical 
College, the South African Political Association, the 
Economic Society of South Africa, was a fellow of the 
Society of Arts, a member of the South African Delville Wood 
Committee and a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society 
(" •••• as a statistician he stands almost alone in the 
mercantile community")(l) 
(1) Mr. J.W.Jagger" in Prominent Men of the Cape Colony, 











Jagger was the first Chairman of the Cape School 
Board from 1905 - 1911; from 1902 until 1930 was a member 
of the University of Cape Town Council; from 1912 - 1930 
a trustee of the South African Museum, and was also a 
member of the Harbour Board. for some time too, Jagger 
was connected with the Somerset Hospital Board. During his 
years of association with the University he was for many 
years Chairman of its finances Committee, while he himself 
donated upwards of £60,000 to the University during his 
lifetime as well as creating the Chairs of Economics and 
Education. The University was also the residuary legatee 
of his estate. 
Jagger was first elected to the old Cape Legislative 
Assembly in 1902, and in 1910 was returned as the Unionist 
member for Cape Town Central. He was also a member of the 
Closer Union Society, eventually playing a prominent part 
at the National Convention. There, had it not been for 
Jagger, Cape Town would probably not have been the legis-
lative capital of the Union. Merriman however, believed 
that, at the National Convention, Jagger had approached 
the question of the capital in "a narrow, commercial spirit"~ 
At the convention Jagger strongly opposed a federal 
structure because of the expenditure involved;(3) 
favoured a uniform, colour-blind franchise for the Union,(4) 
and Objected to the number of Ministers to be appointed. 
Throughout his parliamentary career he lived up to his 
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and aggressive critic of fiscal policy. (5) From 1910-1913 
and 1925-1929 Jagger was an ordinary member of the House 
of Assembly Public Accounts Committee, and served as its 
Chairman from 1914 to 1920{6) In 1918 Jagger refused Botha's 
offer of a knighthood - in fact all his life he hated 
personal publicity and almost the only public honour he ever 
accepted was an Honorary Doctor of Laws from Cape Town 
University in 1929.(7) 
As Minister of Railways and Harbours from 1921 until 
1924 it has been shown that Jagger made himself excessively 
unpopular. Yet he certainly tackled what he knew would be a 
difficult task with great courage. It was this courage in 
fact which enabled him to address a meeting of Rand miners 
and mechanics (before he became a cabinet minister) on the 
advantages of a colour-blind franchise throughout South 
Africa. Jagger was a man of peculiar contradictions. 
Although an arrogant and authoritarian martinet, Jagger 
honestly believed in a non-racial franchise. According to 
his employees he was a very stern taskmaster yet he was the 
first Cape Town businessman to give his employees regular 
holidays. He was a fanatical man for economy, for buying 
cheaply and selling dearly, ~et the evidence of acquaintances 
and his letter-books give an impression of highly efficient 
work, business acumen and an astounding generosity in 
response to appeals from sources of all kinds. "He took 
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followed their methods. They had made almost a fetish 
of character, ability and integrity.n(8) Jagger was a 
stubborn man and, though prepared to listen to other 
views, seldom modified his own. Yet he was never afraid 
to admit that he was wrong. This inability to compromise 
caused his colleagues a certain amount of concern. Duncan 
wrote in february, 1921 on the propsect of Jagger being in 
the Cabinet that "Jagger will be a very difficult man to 
fit in and to work with because he confuses obstinacy with 
sincerity and does not understand compromise •••• I fear 
he will make himself impossible unless he can adapt himself 
to new requirements n .(9) 
The issues which Jagger faced during his term of 
office as Minister of Railways and Harbours indicate that 
he never did learn to compromise. Yet he remained a 
"sincere, honest and determined man of unbounded ~nthusiasm 
••• who had thrown himself into the advocacy of free trade 
with a rooted objection to anything in our tariff system 
which made for protection".(lO) Ashworth maintains that 
Jagger had too narrow a vision to be a successful cabinet 
minister - a fairly accurate assessment of Jagger's tenure 
as Minister of Railways and Harbours. Jagger felt that he 
had to get rid of the railways deficit and, come what may, 
this he did. Yet by his very nature, Jagger, through 
honesty and frankness, gained the respect of friend and 
enemy alike. Even Die Burger commented that "minister 
Jagger is 'n uiters bekwame besigheidsman by wie die 
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beginsels te drywe in goeie hande is".(ll) Though alw,ys 
unpopular, Jagger did "set the railways right". He, of 
all Smuts' cabinet, appeared in the news most frequently. 
It was unfortunate that Jagger could not manage 
to take a broader view of his task in order to be perhapS 
a little less autocratic and energetic. The hopes which 
the Rand Daily mail expressed when Jagger was appointed 
to the cabinet were not fulfilled - " ••••• we do trust 
that mr. Jagger's virtue of economy will not develop 
into the vice of shortsighted retrenchment regardless 
of the future needs of the country ••••• "(12) Jagger 
always tended to lose sight of the fact that people did 
suffer as a result of his policies. He remained a slave 
to his own purpose and drive until his death on June 21, 
1930. 
(11) Die Burger, 28.4.23. 











After exploring, all too rapidly, the most obvious 
sources of which I had knowledge, I was confronted by a 
horrifying dearth of material directly referring to Jagger. 
As a result most of the evidence on his term as minister 
of Railw~ys and Harbours has been culled from official 
publications, and from newspapers. This unfortunately 
resulted in a somewhat limited picture of his career in the 
Cabinet. I regret that it was not possible for me to 
consult the Railway Archives in Johannesburg. 
Both the Duncan and Alexander Collections were 
virtually useless, providing very little information on 
Jagger or the railways. The f.S.malan papers are unfortunate-
ly very thin on the nineteen-twenties. The little that was 
relevant in the Smuts papers was, however, very useful and 
provided some interesting insights. The Jagger Library 
Archives holds a mass of material relating to Jagger, 
collected by mr. R.f.m.Immelman, but contains little of 
value. Private files in the possession of mr. Immelman were 
of far greater assistance and contained some interesting 
material, particularly on the attitudes held by those of 
Jagger's acquaintances whom mr. Immelman was able to inter-
view. my own attempts at interviewing Jagger's descendants 
and surviving acquaintances were generally abortive and 
merely affirmed, in my opinion,- the vast superiority of the 
written word, as historical evidence, compared with that 
of oral evidence. 
Blue books and other parliamentary publications 
were extremely helpful and gave very full information as 
far as the railways and the general tenor of the Smuts 










consulted for this essay, however, it was very difficult 
to assess what Jagger's actual role in each particular 
sphere was. Other than the snippets of personal detail 
culled from a wide variety of sources, the best overall view 
of Jagger's role, as Minister of Railways and Harbours, is 
probably that in Hansard, for which I used the debates as 
reported in the Cape Times, there being no official Hansard 
published for this period. 
The Cape Times was used most extensively of the 
newspapers consulted, but its remarkably strong jingoistic 
slant gave a one-sided commentary on affairs. It was, 
however, very useful insofar as it gave Jagger an excellent 
coverage on most occasions, at times being surprisingly 
critical. This slant was, to a certain extent, balanced 
by use of the Cape Argus and the Rand Daily Mail, but these 
were only very slightly less partisan in their attitude 
to the politics of the time. On the other side of the 
political spectrum Die Burger was easily as biased as the 
Cape Times, using about four-fifths of its editorial space 
to attack Smuts, with the result that very little was said 
about Jagger. Consequently the so-called independent 
journals such as The Cape and The Round Table were sometimes 
helpful in restoring the balance. 
The various service magazines consulted, such as the 
Railway Review and the Railways and Harbours Magazine, were 
useful in giving the attitudes held by railway employees 
towards Jagger's Administration. The Railway Review in 
particular illustrated how strong the antipathy to Jagger 
actually was during these years. 
Of the published works on this period, the most 










which is remarkably objective for its time; its pithy 
epigrams and perceptive insights into character were 
of great assistance. Other articles referring to Jagger 
specifically were mostly expanded or altered versions of 
Neamets ideas. There is little mention of Jagger by Smuts' 
biographers, while his name appears even more infrequently 
in the pages of the general histories. Of the latter the 
most useful were Kruger's The Making of a Nation and 
Walker's History of Southern Africa. The memoirs and 
biographies most useful for the general background included 
Hancock's volumes on Smuts and the reminiscences of Leslie 
Blackwell and W. Duncan Baxter. The theses looked at 
were mainly of a general nature. Those by Hughes and van 
der Schyff dealt with Jagger to a certain extent. The 
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A P PEN DIe E S. 
APPENDIX ONE 
GROSS EARNINGS AND TOTAL EXPENDITURE. 
31. 3. 17 30. 6. 21. 
DIAGQAM ~He\t{IN£3 :-
-- GROSS E:At?NING3 ANO TOTAL eXPE:NDITUk'e. 
-- YEAI< BY yeAI< SINce 31 ~;r MARCH. 1917. --
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FLUCTUATIONS IN EARNINGS AND EXPENDITURE 
- DIAGk'AM !Hi:WING :-
- FLUCTUATIONS IN 
LA~NING5 AND txpeNDITUk'e (J?AILWAYS) __ . ,-
-- MONTH BY MONTH SINce API<'IL., 1920. -
0 II ~I Iii :11 ~ i\j 1-
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RAILWAY REVENUE. 1921-22. 
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25 
Goods and Minerals 
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76' 94 Operating Expenses 











RAILWAY REVENUE, 1923-24. 
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A DlACRAMATIC ~il!!EAJ:VE~TATION OP TNE MOVEMENT IN TH.t!!E 
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BLACK AND WHITE LABOUR ON THE RAILWAYS 
1917 - 1924 
(1) Official Year Book of South Africa: 
Whites Blacks 
1917-18 34,243 32,544 
1918-19 35,283 34,962 
1919-20 39,639 38,189 
1920-21 41,351 40,802 
1921-22 36,258 29,921 
1922-23 35,111 35,307 
(2) Reports of the Railways and Harbours Board: 
Whites BlackS 
1919 33,608 32,071 
1920 36,301 40,020 
1921 33,150 31,392 
1922 31,283 33,601 
1923 31,579 37,111 
1924 33,086 36,036 
(3) Reports of the General llI'anager of the Railways: 
Whites Blacks 
31.3.21 42,578 47,280 
31.3.22 37,444 34,774 
31.3.23 37,759 43,619 
31.3.24 39,629 47,157 
(4) Hansard: 
Whites Blacks 
31.12.20 42,715 42,615 
31.12.22 36,812 37,407 











(1) EXPENDITURE FOR EQUIPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT 
ON TABLE BAY HARBOUR 













(2) TONNAGE HANDLED AT T ABLE BAY 
y'ear Tons 
1909 797,744 
1910 945,288 
1911 1,134,805 
1912 1,508,440 
1913 1,400,253 
1914 1,397,247 
1915 1,476,125 
1916 1,489,316 
1917 1,496,818 
1918 1,405,595 
1919 1,024,415 
1920 1,051,024 
1921 1,264,488 
